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INTRODUCTION 
 
Embarkation 
 
Philostratus’ Heroicus1 is a dialogue on heroes and their cults, which by time of the text’s 
production2 have been abandoned as a result of change. This change is partly due to neglect or 
break with cultic traditions of the past, which are here idealized in all their aspects. The story is as 
follows: a merchant sailing from Phoenicia into the Aegean Sea is detained by lack of winds at 
Elaious, a town on the Thracian Chersonese. There he meets a vinedresser, who supposedly shares 
in the intimate friendship and knowledge of the ghost of the hero Protesilaus. After exchanging 
pleasantries, the Phoenician shares a dream he had about stopping over in Elaious, where he reads 
the Catalogue of Ships (Iliad 2) and lets the Achaean soldiers embark on his ship. As soon as the 
merchant gets an early taste of the divine wisdom of Protesilaus, captured by the divine site of his 
heroic cult and the eroticized landscape, he self-interprets his dream as an imperative to hear about 
the heroes of the Trojan War, in order to obtain favorable winds.  
These new stories are told by the vinedresser on the authority of Protesilaus, who, after 
dying in Troy, acquired divine wisdom and periodically engaged in ‘correcting’ Homer’s poems. 
Initially, the Phoenician merchant exhibits serious resistance and disbelief towards these ‘new 
stories’. In order for the storyteller to circumvent his interlocutor’s skepticism, the vinedresser 
engages various means to make his account plausible. In this light, the most prevailing accounts 
of the Trojan War are seen as poetic lies or repressions of truth. The most notorious instance of 
such repressions is the Odyssey, the bargaining outcome between Homer and Odysseus seeking to 
restore his repute in exchange for exclusive material about the Trojan War3. The major stake in 
this settlement was the suppression of Palamedes, an intelligent hero who suffered no less than 
Ajax from Odysseus’ wickedness. This said, a large part of the text seeks to restore Palamedes to 
his heroic ethos and intellectual status. Defending Palamedes’ case takes the form of an apologia 
                                                             
1 Scholarly consensus attributes this text to Flavius Philostratus, author of Vita Apollonii, Vitae sophistarum, Imagines 
I–II, Nero, a collection of Letters, a couple of Dialexeis, and Gymnasticus; Miles (2017)b 273–275. 
2 For the proposed dates of the text see Maclean–Aitken (2001) xlii–xlv. This issue does not affect our argument here. 
However, I agree with those readings of Heroicus as a product of the immediate cultural, social, and political 
conditions of its production; according to Aitken (2004) 280–284 and Shayegan (2004) 285–286, in this text, 
Philostratus arguably advocates Severan policies against the rising empire of the Sasanians, a hypothesis that locates 
the text in the reign of Alexander Severus (reign 222–235 CE).     
3 Her. 43.12–16. For the motif of hero in league with author see Anderson (1986) 245–246. 
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with strong encomiastic features emphasizing the hero’s sophistic wisdom. One of the models 
Philostratus had in mind in re-enacting the hero’s apology must have been Gorgias’ Defense of 
Palamedes (Palamedes)4 composed in the fifth century BCE. But to what extent did Philostratus 
rely on this source? 
 
 
‘Gorgianizing’ and Corpus 
 
Explicit claims about Gorgias are made in Lives of the sophists (Lives) and the seventy-third letter 
to Julia Domna, both testifying to Philostratus’ detailed and systematic study of the sophist’s style. 
In these texts, we learn of a series of authors, amongst whom also Plato, who emulated Gorgias. 
Philostratus coins the term ‘Gorgianizing’ to refer to their emulations. Drawing upon existing 
confidence in explicit inferences Philostratus makes about the vast amount of authors admiring the 
sophist and his eloquence, we may set out to explore instances where he, too, alludes to Gorgias 
or reproduces his style and thought.  This can happen i) by way of imitating Gorgias’ elaborate 
stylistic figuration (the so–called gorgieia schemata5), ii) through implementation of 
argumentative patterns exemplified in Gorgias’ model speeches, or iii) by incorporating ideas and 
themes, which were associated with Gorgias. 
Of these forms, I will mainly focus on argumentation and thematic development, discussed 
in chapters 2 and 3 respectively, because of the degree of complexity involved. For a literatus like 
Philostratus it would not be that hard to furnish symmetrical sentences flooded with rhyming 
endings and antitheses. But how easy would it be to grasp and incorporate the substance of 
Gorgias’ thought? The question is not easy to answer, primarily because there is no definite answer 
to what exactly Gorgias’ substantive thought consisted in, if at anything. For while for sophists 
like Prodicus of Ceos or Protagoras of Abdera it is puzzling to understand the subtleties of their 
doctrine, yet scholars more or less agree on what framed their chief ideas, in Gorgias’ case, there 
is a vast disagreement on whether or not such a framework even existed6. Was he a rhetorician? A 
philosopher? Or a philosophical sophist? 
                                                             
4 The edition I am using for Gorgias’ fragments is Diels–Kranz’ (1952). 
5 Diod. Sic. 12.53.4. 
6 Consigny (2001) 3. 
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Philostratus seems to opt for the latter option. The idea of philosophical sophist did not 
only qualify intellectuals of the ancient times as we learn in Lives; rather, it seems to parade 
through the entire Corpus Philostrateum and permeate its stories and characters. Here we will see 
that the merging of philosophy and sophistry may in some cases be synonymous to the act of 
‘Gorgianizing’. To this end, Heroicus provides for an interesting case study in the following 
respects: 1) the first part of the text seeks to account for the aletheia in Protesilaus’ stories about 
the Trojan War. How is this ‘new truth’ made plausible? Apart from the authority of Protesilaus, 
the vinedresser engages in refuting older accounts, on the basis of their logical improbabilities. 
Persuasion is pivotal to winning over the Phoenician who shows his disbelief upfront7. One of the 
means the vinedresser deploys to overcome the Phoenician’s skepticism is the argument from 
probability in combination with strategies of deductive reasoning. The argumentation process, I 
argue, is evocative of Gorgias’ Palamedes. 2) After the Phoenician has successfully yielded to the 
vinedresser/Protesilaus, everything is set for the main discussion, that is, the Catalogue of the 
heroes. A prominent passage here is about the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes. In this 
thesis, I will examine Philostratus’ Palamedes not only as culture hero, but also as a sophist-hero, 
not very distant from the prominent intellectuals of Lives or from the divine thaumaturge in Vita 
Apollonii.  
 
 
Status quaestionis and Research question 
 
In his lucidly argued treatment, Consigny (2001) devotes considerable space to establishing how 
Plato and Aristotle’s views have biased all later authors’ conception of Gorgias, thus creating a 
‘hermeneutic aporia’. Consigny locates Philostratus amongst a series of authors, like Pausanias, 
Diodorus, and Cicero, who deemed Gorgias as a ‘stylist without much substance’ (pp. 151–2). 
This does no justice at all, first and foremost, to Consigny’s own approach: in order to rehabilitate 
Gorgias as a serious thinker, he uses Philostratus as evidence. A striking example lies in the second 
paragraph on page 37, where Consigny says ‘we are justified in repudiating the notion that Gorgias 
is a frivolous orator rather than a philosopher worth taking seriously’ and a few lines later he cites 
Philostratus’ Lives as proof. Additionally, the passage he adduces also from Lives on page 151 
serves by no means as prima facie evidence that ‘Philostratus draws no connection between 
                                                             
7 Her. 3.1. 
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Gorgias’ substantive thought and the manner of his speaking and writing’ (151–2). In this thesis, 
we will see that Philostratus not only perceived the substance of Gorgianic thought but also 
incorporated and reproduced it. As said, our focus will be on Heroicus, to which I now turn.         
 In his exhaustive commentary, Grossardt (2004) dismisses previous interpretations of 
Heroicus as reflecting Philostratus’ adherence to Caracalla’s religious beliefs or his wish to 
revitalize ancient heroic cults (Eitrem (1929) 1ff., Mantero (1966) 225). Based on the hymn 
Achilles composes for Echo8, a clear notion of intertextuality, he chooses to read the text as a 
tribute to poetry. Heroicus indeed exposes the author’s self-conscious attempt to ‘compete’ with 
the prevailing accounts (especially Homer) of the Trojan War, a practice known in Imperial 
literature as Sophistic Homerkritik (Dué – Nagy (2004) 51–54, Mestre (2004) 127–141, Maclean 
– Aitken (2001) lx–lxxvi, Zeitlin (2001) 255–66, and Anderson (1986) 242–4).   
These interpretations sit well with my approach in this thesis, in that they capture the central 
role of intertextuality, metatextualism, and self-reflexivity (Whitmarsh (2004), (2009)). 
Philostratus knows his classics and handles his sources with a great deal of allusion and ambiguity 
(Rusten (2004) 144–5); One of these elusive authorities is Gorgias of Leontini, the model sophist 
for Philostratus (Mestre (2004) 138). Intertextuality with Gorgias informs both the formal aspect 
of the text and the thematic development of its intellectual characters. It is here examined in 
relation to Homeric revisionism, the establishment of authority, and the phenomenology of 
paideia, that is, the aspects of the text which reflect the preoccupations and conflicts of intellectuals 
in Philostratus’ day. The impressive scholarly work focusing in the last two decades on the rivalry 
between Odysseus and Palamedes (Mariscal (2008), Favreau Linder (2015), Miles (2017)a), and 
the ongoing debate on Philostratus’ definition of the Second Sophistic in relation to its cultural 
legacy (Anderson (1986), (1993), Whitmarsh (2017) have led me to the main research question I 
raise in this thesis:  
 
How does Philostratus articulate and promote his intellectual agenda by ways of 
‘Gorgianizing’, that is, emulation of and rivalry with Gorgias, in Heroicus?  
 
 
                                                             
8 Ibid. 55.3. 
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Method 
 
The primary method I will use to substantiate my argument is close reading. In addition, 
intertextuality will prove a useful methodical tool to address Gorgias’ influence on Philostratus as 
well as the thematic and conceptual evocations of texts from the Classical period in Second 
Sophistic literature. If Philostratus could not influence what Gorgias wrote, he could nonetheless 
influence how his readers, including ourselves, perceived of Gorgias’ writings. Furthermore, as 
many scholars have noticed, several aspects of Heroicus, such as its landscape (i.e. the 
Chersonesus, that is, the juncture between the Western and Eastern Empire), the cult sight of 
Protesilaus, the dynamic interaction of the two interlocutors (i.e. a Greek educated vinedresser 
constructed as the ‘insider’ of Hellenic culture vs a Phoenician stranger and ‘outsider’), and the 
values they represent (i.e. rural labor, rustic philosophy, simplistic lifestyle vis-à-vis urban lifestyle 
and mercantile attitude 9) are apt examples of how Heroicus is implicated with questions of cultural 
identity and self-construction. Similarly, the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes is one of 
the main markers of the text’s sophisticated literary texture.    
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 Phoenicians in ancient literature represent the vices of city life as well as trickster and fraud; Aitken (2004) 267–285 
explores the shifts in the symbolism of the word in the advent of the Severans. 
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CHAPTER I 
Re-introducing Gorgias to his fan-club 
 
This chapter, occupies surest ground in order to prepare the way for the main analysis of the 
following three chapters. My aim is to establish that Philostratus studied Gorgias in depth as the 
archetypal sophist. The texts I will draw my inferences from are: Lives10, written before 238 CE, 
and the seventy-third letter to the empress Julia Domna, wife of Septimius Severus (reign 193–
211 CE)11. Lives is a quasi–biographical12 account of different types of sophists dating from 
Gorgias to Philostratus’ contemporaries. It has been considered a fundamental source of sophistic 
activity in the Imperial Era. Yet, the arrangement of the material often takes the reader unawares, 
while many of the biographies include serious falsities13. Consequently, despite the genuine 
scholarly interest, it does not aim at the extremes of antiquarian exactitude14. Starting with the 
more counter-intuitive letter 73 and then moving to the more schematic Lives, I will briefly discuss 
the specific passages, which construe Gorgias as the origin of sophistry and its functions, a cultural 
legacy, as it were, historically transmitted to and interpreted by Philostratus.  
 
 
I. An appeal to the empress 
 
An intensifying οὐδὲ ὁ θεσπέσιος Πλάτων (not even the divine Plato15) kicks off Philostratus’ 
confessional letter to his patroness, Julia Domna, serving to establish that not even the greatest 
among the philosophers envied the sophists. Rather, he was emulous of their style and mannerisms, 
and even rivaled Gorgias in ‘Gorgianizing’16. This beginning takes the reader aback, in that it 
withholds Plato’s severe criticisms of sophists and proposes a reconciliation between two 
                                                             
10 Transl. Wright (1921) adapted. The text is Stefec’s (2016).  
11 Date is uncertain; Demoen – Praet (2012) n.13 437–438. 
12 Swain (1991) 151: ‘a sort of cross between biography and the blend of biography and doxography’.  
13 Schmitz (2009) 49–51 accepts Philostratus’ knowledge about his subject and attributes part of the text’s 
inconsistencies to the discrepancies between the historical Philostratus and the implied narrative persona. Swain 
(1991) 152–163 thoroughly checks the veracity of Philostratus’ data on the basis of his access to Athenian and Roman 
sources, and his acquaintances, while holding offices in Athens or as member of Julia’s circle in Rome. See also 
Anderson (1986) 24–25.  
14 Anserson (1986) 14. 
15 Transl. Benner (1949) adapted. The text is Kayser’s (1871) (repr. Hildesheim (1964)). 
16 Cf. VS 493.  
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antagonistic discourses, that is, sophistry and philosophy. The literary interest of the text is 
betrayed by the use of metalanguage; γοργιάζειν (emulating Gorgias’ style) is probably a 
Philostratean invention.   
 Later on, the author ventures on arguing that in the long history of Greek literature, many 
authors17 have by convention emulated (ζηλωταὶ ἐγένοντο) one sophist or another. While Hippias, 
Protagoras, and Prodicus are also mentioned, it is Gorgias who typifies the notion of ‘sophistic’. 
For the Thessalians, practice of oratory translated to ‘Gorgianizing’18. Aspasia trained Pericles to 
speak like Gorgias. Critias and Thucydides are also great examples of literary emulation; 
Philostratus here captures the notion of remodeling one’s own style according to one’s genius 
(μεταποιοῦντες ἐς τὸ οἰκεῖον)19. Then, we have an excerpt from Aeschines the Socratic, composed 
of four cola of eight, eight, nine, and ten syllables, serving to illustrate a structural ‘Gorgianism’20. 
Finally, the elements ἀποστάσεις and προσβολαί (break-offs and sudden transitioning) are said to 
often be adopted by epic poets. A very interesting piece of information is given in the beginning 
of this list of imitators: 
 
The admirers of Gorgias were excellent men and very numerous; […] in the next place his admirers 
embraced the entire Greek people (εἶτα τὸ ξύμπαν Ἑλληνικόν), among whom, at Olympia, from the 
threshold of the temple, he delivered an oration against the barbarians21.              Ep. 73.18–23 
 
After Gorgias’ oration at Olympia, (see also next section), every Greek became his admirer. This 
exaggerated statement about Gorgias’ large amount of devotees is the second indication, after 
‘Plato the Gorgianizer’, of Philostratus’ inflated subjectivism. Now, not only does Gorgias’ biggest 
adversary accommodate himself to the sophist’s ideas (ἰδέας! – interestingly on Plato’s own 
terms), but the entire Greece, the whole world, as it were, has known of and is following Gorgias.  
 As we are moving to the as startling end of the letter, the empress is asked to persuade 
(πεῖθε; note the aspectual difference from πεῖσον) Plutarch (?) not to take any offence at the 
sophists nor vilify Gorgias. Regardless of the interpretative difficulty of this section22, given that 
                                                             
17 Cf. ‘the most illustrious men’ (τοὺς ἐλλογιμωτάτους), in VS 493.   
18 Ep. 73: τὸ ῥητορεύειν γοργιάζειν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔσχεν; cf. VS 521.2–3; see also Pl. Men. 70a–b, where Socrates tells 
Meno that the Thessalians were in earlier times famous for their wealth and horse-riding, but ever since Gorgias came 
to their land he turned them into ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ (lovers of wisdom). For Gorgias in Thessaly, see also Isoc. 15.155–
156, Cic. Orat. 52.175, and Paus. 6.17.8–9. 
19 Ep. 73.27. 
20 Costa (2001) ad loc. 
21 Cf. VS 501–502. 
22 See Penella (1979) 163–4 for a summary on the existing scholarship.  
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Plutarch had long before passed away, it is interesting that the author calls him θαρσαλεώτερον 
τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ. Many scholars have translated this as ‘boldest among the Greeks’, but I personally 
wish to construe τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ as genitivus comparationis, that is, ‘too bold to be a Greek’. The 
idea of ‘Greekness’ was first introduced with ξύμπαν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, which elevated Gorgias to a 
paradigm of Pan-Hellenic recognition. If we interpret πεῖθε Πλούταρχον as symbolic, it is possible 
that Philostratus here pictures members of the elite or intellectual rivals as opposing imperial 
ideology or/and his own profession. This would also justify why the author marshals successive 
authorities construed as subservient to Gorgias: if even Plato, and every other Greek followed 
Gorgias and the sophists, then, a fortiori, what legitimates Plutarch’s stepping out of line? Provided 
that Julia was still alive23, the author arguably asks her to stem the flow of a cultural move that is 
growing θαρσαλεώτερον than what the he and his patroness can allow.  
 In listing Gorgias’ intellectual fan club, Philostratus subconsciously becomes a member 
himself, and in talking about Gorgias’ rhetoric, he cannot resist a resounding ‘Gorgiasm’:  
   
ἐγὼ δὲ εἰπεῖν ἔχων οὐκ ἔχω. 
I could tell you, but I cannott.                                    Ep. 73.41–42 
   
  
II. Towards the ‘Father of sophistry’ 
 
Let us now move to Lives, where we happen on a more reifying account of the sophist. Before the 
actual lives start, Philostratus considers a cluster of intellectuals who, in ancient times, were 
deemed sophists but in his view were ‘philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and 
fluency’24. The list of the eight philosophers who were wrongly called sophists (οὐκ ὄντες 
σοφισταί, δοκοῦντες δὲ παρῆλθον ἐς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην) starts with Eudoxus of Cnidus (early 
Hellenistic times) and finishes with Favorinus25 (early Second Sophistic). Then follows a second 
group of sophists proper, who are deemed as forbearers of the Second Sophistic, originating in 
fifth-century Classical Athens with Gorgias of Leontini. This group, we are told later, also treated 
                                                             
23 Demoen – Praet (2012) 438. 
24 VS 484. 
25 VS 484–489. 
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philosophical subjects. One would wonder what the actual distinguishing feature is between the 
two groups, since all those intellectuals more or less relished philosophy.’26  
What seems more vital to our inquiry, however, is how this classification allows for a first 
definition of ‘sophist’ in Philostratus: 
 
The men of former days applied the name “sophist,” not only to orators whose surpassing eloquence 
won them a brilliant reputation, but also to philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and 
fluency.                                                   VS 484 
 
So ancient definitions of ‘sophist’ were broader and wrongly encompassed some philosophers. 
What are these philosophers doing here? Apparently, the only criterion of inclusion, was their 
eloquence, an implicit indication that rhetoric may co-exist with philosophy, but is always by 
convention superior. In principle, he disagrees with the second part of the ancient definition (ἀλλὰ 
καί…) but he seems to be fine with the first, judging from the οὐ μόνον, which we may construe 
as not solely. Consequently, the first thing we get to know about Gorgias is that he was 
righteously27 considered a sophist, that is, a rhetor whose eloquence granted him great public 
reputation. 
 The second element is derived from the group where the sophist belongs. Αt the outset of 
book 1, the ancient sophistic is described as a form of philosophical rhetoric regarding its subjects, 
but with different methods than philosophy28. So Gorgias is one of the philosophical sophists. And 
not only just; he is – third element – the originator of the ancient (philosophical) sophistic29 and – 
fourth – of extemporization: 
 
σχεδίου δὲ λόγου <sc. ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ> Γοργίας ἄρξαι—παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθήνῃσι θέατρον 
ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν “προβάλλετε” καὶ τὸ κινδύνευμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἀνεφθέγξατο, ἐνδεικνύμενος δήπου 
πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι, περὶ παντὸς δ᾿ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφιεὶς τῷ καιρῷ […]  
 
And (I think) that it was Gorgias who founded (ἄρξαι) the art of extempore oratory (σχεδίου δὲ λόγου). 
For when he appeared in the theatre at Athens he had the courage to say, “You may propose a theme” 
(ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν “προβάλλετε”); and he was the first to risk this bold announcement, making 
manifest that he was omniscient and that he could speak on any subject whatever, trusting to the 
inspiration of the moment;                                                                                                       VS 482 
 
 
                                                             
26 For possible explanations of the absurdity of the scheme see Anderson (1986) 10–12 and Civiletti (2002) ad loc.  
27 VS 492: οἱ δὲ κυρίως προσρηθέντες σοφισταί. 
28 VS 480: τὴν ἀρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν ῥητορικὴν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν; cf. VS 481: καὶ τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα 
ὑποτιθεμένη. 
29 VS 481. 
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This passage is a good example of what Philostratus exactly means by ἀρχή, ἄρξαι, and possibly 
ἀρχαίας or ἀρχαιοτέρας σοφιστικῆς. It is impossible to imagine that clever speaking in public 
contexts started in the fifth century. Already in Homer, the term σοφός (wise) often denotes the 
man of practical knowledge and prudence in public affairs; in Theognis, σοφίη (wisdom) assumes 
the meaning of duplicitous cleverness seen as superior to the greatest ἀρετή30. Also, in Plato’s 
Protagoras, the sophistic art is said to have existed already in the times of Homer, Hesiod, and 
Simonides, but those sophists of old laid no claim to such a name in fear of prosecution31.   
 Gorgias is connected to the concept of ἀρχή because he was the first to give a definite form 
to the art of rhetoric, in which Philostratus roots his Second Sophistic. The birth of rhetoric is 
located in a specified time and space, that is, in 427 BCE in the theatre of Athens; it was an act of 
dear and hazard (πρῶτος ἐθάρρησε ... τὸ κινδύνευμα τοῦτο). Rhetoric – or at least the epideictic 
genre – is actualized hinc et nunc, and within a community. The audience literally put forward any 
topic (προβάλλετε), of which the public speaker must appear knowledgeable (πάντα εἰδέναι, περὶ 
παντὸς δ᾿ ἂν εἰπεῖν), using his invention and estimating the situational factors (ἐφιεὶς τῷ καιρῷ). 
To support his claim that Gorgias introduced the notions of improvisation and kairos, Philostratus 
shares an anecdote about a certain Chaerephon wishing to ridicule the sophist, an attempt which 
fell on face. We will return to this joke in chapter 3. 
‘Sicily produced Gorgias of Leontini, and we must consider that the art of the sophists 
carries back to him as though he were its father (ὥσπερ ἐς πατέρα)’ just like Aeschylus in tragedy32. 
As a fifth clue, Gorgias is constructed as father of sophistry, an assertion of his authority serving 
to augment the idea of ἀρχή: in a way, all generations of orators to come will follow Gorgias’ 
footsteps. The analogy to Aeschylus is telling; the construction of literary authority relies on 
common cultural knowledge, shared between author and reader, who is asked to perceive Gorgias’ 
contribution to sophistic thought by analogy with Aeschylus’ innovations in tragedy (εἰ γὰρ τὸν 
Αἰσχύλον ἐνθυμηθείημεν, ὡς πολλὰ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ ξυνεβάλετο; note the use of first person plural).  
 What are these innovations? Some elements typical of Gorgias’ style, such as daring and 
unusual expressions (ὁρμῆς τε καὶ παραδοξολογίας), a sense of sublimity (πνεύματος) and a grand 
style for great things (τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλως ἑρμηνεύειν), break-off’s amid sentences (ἀποστάσεων), 
sudden transitioning (προσβολῶν), and the use of poetic words (ποιητικὰ ὀνόματα). To these we 
                                                             
30 Theog. El. 1.1074. 
31 Pl. Prot. 316d–e.  
32 VS 492; see Civiletti (2002) ad loc. 
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should add the use of repetition of endings in words (ὁμοιοτέλευτα), corresponding structure in 
phrases or sentences (πάρισα), and antithesis (ἀντίθετα), of which we learn later in the life of 
Polus33. 
 Finally, Philostratus pays extra heed to the speeches Gorgias delivered at some of the Pan-
Hellenic shrines and festivals: he mentions Gorgias’ Pythian oration at Delphi, his Olympic 
oration, and his funerary speech in Athens. If we compare those mentions to the previous passage 
about the birth of epideictic rhetoric, in the theatre of Dionysus, and the letter’s ξύμπαν τὸ 
Ἑλληνικόν, we can see that, in Philostratus, Gorgias’ sophia and speeches on critical matters are 
routinely connected to Pan-Hellenic institutions and by extension elevated to Pan-Hellenic 
significance.  
 
 
III. Syncrisis 
 
Compared to the more scholarly Lives34, which, despite the slips, manages quite ably to record 
sophistic activity in the first three centuries CE, the letter to Julia offers a more romanticized 
perspective about Gorgias; one that agrees with the less restrictive genre of (fictive?) 
correspondence. Yet, both texts give a good insight into Philostratus’ construals of Gorgias. The 
letter establishes the universality of Gorgias and the applicability of ‘Gorgianizing’ in even the 
most unimaginable fields. Those who were emulous of Gorgias evolved to as high or even higher 
levels of success, engaged in φιλοτιμία (ambition), while those, who could not attain their goals, 
were invested in φθόνος (envy, malignity). Lives poses the notion of ‘literary father’ of various 
concepts regarding speech and delivery. Both texts propound the harmonization between sophistry 
and philosophy, with the latter subservient to the former. Finally, the letter indicates clearly the 
author’s self-awareness about his own engagement in ‘Gorgianizing’. These said, we are now 
ready to step into more difficult territory of intertextuality with Gorgias. 
 
                                                             
33 VS 497.  
34 Philostratus calls his work φρόντισμα, that is, a well-thought-out piece. 
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CHAPTER II 
Persuasion 
 
The closing line of the letter to Julia (ἐγὼ δὲ εἰπεῖν ἔχων οὐκ ἔχω) wittily captures the implied 
author as inadvertently becoming part of the ‘Gorgianizing’ tradition he has just been talking 
about. This tradition has been and will remain uninterrupted: from the old times of Periclean 
democracy through the days of the Severans, ‘speaking in the manner of Gorgias’ is constructed 
as a diachronic cultural phenomenon.    
Numerous passages in the Philostratean corpus prove the author’s precocious aptitude for 
‘Gorgianizing’35. A good example is the prominent section on Nicetes of Smyrna (VS 511), the 
father, as it were, of the Second Sophistic36. This passage abounds in Gorgianic figures37. In 
adopting Gorgias’ style the implied author establishes a ring composition between the beginnings 
of his two books (and by extension a connection between the ‘fathers’ of the two sophistics), and 
expects us to see Nicetes in a light comparable to Gorgias. Imbuing a new stage of sophistic 
tradition with ‘Gorgiasms’ has cultural implications: the author-biographer has awareness that 
these ‘new’ features of the discipline are connected to the ‘old and classic’ ones. Innovation is not 
a break with tradition but rather a process of grounding and embedding.  
This and the following chapter examine cases of ‘allusive Gorgianizing’ in Heroicus. As 
we will see, Philostratus was deeply invested in Gorgias’ substantive thought and his contribution 
to the development of argumentation theory and art of persuasion. It goes without saying, that it is 
impossible to quantify in precision the extent, to which Gorgias had influenced Philostratus’ 
thought, first and foremost because a great deal of Gorgias’ writing is lost38. For instance, his 
predominantly philosophical work On-non being is available to us only through adaptations. 
                                                             
35 Demoen – Praet (2012) n.10 437. 
36 At the outset of Lives (481), Philostratus says that the distant father of the Second Sophistic is Aeschines, thus dating 
its inception back to the 4th century BCE. However, the beginning of the move is officially signaled by the biographer 
with Nicetes of Smyrna (1st century CE); Anderson (1993) 19. 
37 (1) homoeoteleuta: δικανικά…σοφιστικὰ, ἐκόσμησεν…ἐπέρρωσεν, (2) isocola  (2 x 3 cola): τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικανικὸν 
/ σοφιστικῇ περιβολῇ / ἐκόσμησεν // τὸ δὲ σοφιστικὸν / κέντρῳ δικανικῷ / ἐπέρρωσεν  (3) parison  in the last two 
sentences: the syntactical order in both sentences is as follows: object (δικανικὸν, σοφιστικὸν) – dative of manner 
(σοφιστικῇ περιβολῇ, κέντρῳ δικανικῷ) – main verb (ἐκόσμησεν, ἐπέρρωσεν), (4) antithesis: τοῖς μὲν δικανικοῖς… 
τὰ δικανικά //  τοῖς δὲ σοφιστικοῖς τὰ σοφιστικὰ, (5) chiasmus: δικανικὸν…σοφιστικῇ // σοφιστικὸν…δικανικῷ, (6) 
the idiomatic adverb περιδεξίως, which is used only here, and is derived from περιδέξιος (bidexterous). Finally (7), 
all these elements together make the excerpt read as a wordplay, or paronomasia, another characteristic of Gorgias’ 
style; cf. VS 606: δικανικοῦ μὲν σοφιστικώτερος, σοφιστικοῦ δὲ δικανικώτερος; for such figures see Porter (1997) 12. 
38 Consigny (2001) 4–10. 
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Philostratus, on the other hand, had more direct access to Gorgias. In VS 604, he says that his 
teacher Proclus of Naucratis was an admirer of Gorgias and imitated his style (ἐῴκει καὶ 
γοργιάζοντι).  Also, within the context of defining the third-century present by reference to the 
idealized past,  a greater part of Gorgias’ own works would go around and be discussed amongst 
the intellectuals of the imperial court, with whom Philostratus was associated. This creates a 
predicament for any modern scholar who wishes to measure how ancient sophists influenced 
Philostratus’ literary ideas. However, there are reasons to see the glass as half full instead of half 
empty. Besides the two fully preserved speeches of Gorgias and Sextus and the anonymous’ 
adaptations of On-non being, we also have at our disposal a plethora of ancient testimonia 
including Gorgias’ own aphorisms, ancient ideas about Gorgias’ teaching, as well as Plato’s 
literary adaptations. The latter can be as helpful as detrimental for anyone who wants to recover 
the image of the real sophist, a danger on which McComiskey raises awareness39. We can be sure 
that Philostratus was aware of Plato’s critiques on Gorgias, both because of the reconciliatory tone 
of letter 73 and most importantly because of the main role Platonic dialogues like Phaedrus and 
Gorgias played in two- and third-century CE education. Our approach in establishing that 
Philostratus engaged in ‘allusive Gorgianizing’ in Heroicus should therefore accommodate not 
only the original sophist’s own fragments but also the ancient testimonies.  
The main question I raise here is: How are patterns of reasoning used in Gorgias’ 
Palamedes evoked in the vinedresser’s argumentation in Heroicus? Before I take up this question, 
I will establish a few introductory points about Palamedes as exemplar defense speech, in 
juxtaposition to Gorgias’ reception in Imperial education. Then I will introduce the argumentative 
patterns demonstrated in Palamedes’ apology, and, in turn, examine how they are evoked and 
embedded in Heroicus’ refutative discourse.  
   
 
I. Why Gorgias’ Palamedes? 
 
Various sources make mention of the enormous impression Gorgias’ clever use of argument made 
to the Athenians, when, in 427 BCE as ambassador of Leontini, he was sent to request the support 
of Athens. His Palamedes is intrinsically connected to the use of effective argumentation. 
According to myth, Odysseus plotted against Palamedes because he exposed his trickster in order 
                                                             
39 (2002) 17–31. 
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to avoid joining the Greek expedition against Troy. Odysseus furnished incriminating proof and 
hided it in Palamedes’ tent so that the hero would appear as loyal to Priam and traitor to the Greek 
cause.  The myth supplied the framework of an exemplary defense40; Gorgias’ main stake was to 
present an argumentation model, which would be operational for any defendant being unjustly 
accused. Its focus is on inventio, that is, a process of inventing logical, ethical, and emotional 
arguments from probability41. The strategies used pertain to deductive logic, such us apagogic 
argument or eliminative deduction, argument from antinomies, eikotic (probabilities) and ethotic 
argumentation (character). In all, the speech showcases methods of topical invention combining 
logos, ethos, and eikos. A prime mythic inventor, such as Palamedes, seems to be the perfect 
instrument to reflect on rhetorical invention, an idea we will see in comparison with Philostratus’ 
Palamedes in chapter 3. 
According to some sources, Gorgias composed a techne, that is, a handbook about rhetoric 
and speech making techniques, and he was a teacher of rhetoric42. Philostratus says he was teacher 
of the most illustrious men of the time. In fact, his two fictional rhetorical treatises, Helen and 
Palamedes, were transmitted in a manual of rhetorical instruction, which may have comprised 
model speeches memorized by students as exemplary pieces of the principles in rhetorical 
practice43. To this testifies the genre of the two texts: Helen belongs to the epideictic type of 
rhetoric while Palamedes is a blend of both judicial and epideictic elements, an epideixis of the 
author’s method in argument44. Both Helen and Palamedes grapple with questions of logos, 
whether that be studies on language, its workings and power (Helen), or systematic approaches to 
reasoning and dicanic argumentation (Palamedes)45. 
Ancient authors regarded several innovations in artistic prose as typically Gorgianic46. 
Diodorus ascribes to Gorgias certain figures, which, according to him, were unknown to Athens 
before his arrival in 427, and were readily accepted thereafter47. Of these figures, antithesis is a 
particularly important element48 for the purposes of the current analysis, in that it underpins the 
                                                             
40 Consigny (2001) 38, Porter (1997) 11. 
41 McComiskey (2002) 47. 
42 Diod. Sic. 12.53.2 says that Gorgias was the first to invent technical manuals; see also Syr. In Hermog. 90.12–16, 
Quint. 3.1.8, Diog. Laert. 8.58; see also Cic. Inv. 1.7. 
43 Cole (1991) 75–6. 
44 Porter (1991) 44. 
45 Consigny (2001) 2, 38. 
46 For a discussion of both ancient and modern sources as well as the biases of ascribing these innovations to Gorgias 
see Finley (1939) 38 – 62. 
47 Diod. Sic. 12.53.4. 
48 Cic. Orat. 12.39, 52.175. 
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core of antilogical argumentation. Antithesis can be a rhetorical device whereby opposing 
structures are introduced to achieve a contrastive effect. By and large, it predicates the oppositional 
reasoning and the antagonistic environment, within which a debate – in this case, between 
Odysseus and Palamedes – takes place. Gorgias’ Palamedes employs the antithesis in manifold 
ways: i) in phraseology (e.g. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ σαφῶς <εἰδὼς> ὁ κατήγορος κατηγορεῖ μου, σαφῶς 
οἶδα)49 ii) in presenting his character in contrast to his opponent’s (ἄξιον γὰρ καταμαθεῖν, οἷος ὢν 
οἷα λέγεις ὡς ἀνάξιος ἀναξίῳ)50, and iii) in refutation (see below, II.II and II.III in this chapter).  
 For these reasons, one could possibly argue that texts like Palamedes or Antiphon’s 
Tetralogies were in some way the forerunners of the preliminary rhetorical exercises, known as 
Progymnasmata, of the Imperial Era51. The purpose of these texts was roughly the same as the 
purpose of the technai, namely to equip students with inventional and dispositional strategies, 
which they were expected to implement in their future declamations52. According to the content of 
the extant Progymnasmata and the commentary of John of Sardis, these exercises trained the 
students to logically reason against an utterance or situation drawn from myths (refutation, 
ἀνασκευή), on the basis of improbability or inconsistency; they were also expected to argue in 
favor of something drawn from literature (confirmation, κατασκευή). Students were also trained 
to independently form their argumentation (θέσις), work out common places (κοινοί τόποι)53, and 
attack or praise individuals (ψόγος, ἐγκώμιον). In addition, we do know that some of these 
exercises focused on crafting speeches attributed to the ghost of a mythical character, written in 
first person and in a style that would suit the figure’s character. In this category of exercises, called 
personifications (προσωποποιίαι), students needed to invent a character that would apply to the 
given circumstances and would say appropriate things. The rivalry between Palamedes and 
Odysseus was a common theme in προσωποποιίαι54. From this perspective, it would not be 
inconceivable to suggest (and in doing so, let us not forget the notion of ‘father of sophistry’) that 
                                                             
49 Pal. 5. 
50 Pal. 22. 
51 For the term see Kennedy (2003) v–vii and Webb (2017) 144–8. 
52 However, the handbooks of the first sophists ‘should not be regarded as very sophisticated or theoretical treatments’, 
as Porter (1991) 10 notes. These handbooks offered examples and topoi, which one could use for specific contexts. 
Russell (1983) 9–20 argues that the concept of melete (declamation) originated in the late fifth century with orators 
making up speeches in character for various purposes (see specifically 16–17). Mendelson (2002) 193 continues that 
declamatory exercises ‘as literary models of discursive battle’ were ‘on full display in Gorgias’ Palamedes and 
Antiphon’s Tetralogies […]’.  
53 Topoi are not arguments per se, but places where one should look for arguments; Porter (1991) 95. 
54 Miles (2017)a 85; cf. Mantero (1966) 120 n.1. 
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Philostratus, read Palamedes as a text with progymnasmatic value, an exercise avant la lettre55, 
which in the Progymnasmata of the Roman Empire, will be defined as personification56. 
Notably, in the preface of Nicolaus’ Progymnasmata (5th century CE), Gorgias is explicitly 
connected to invention. Nicolaus subscribes to Theodorus’ definition of rhetoric as ‘a dynamis of 
invention (εὑρετική) and expression (ἑρμηνευτική), with ornament (μετὰ κόσμου), of the available 
means of persuasion (τῶν ἐνδεχομένων πιθανῶν) in every discourse’57. As δύναμις rhetoric is 
neutral and thus can be used for good or bad, comments Nicolaus, not aiming ‘to persuade in every 
case, but to speak persuasively in accord with what is available’58. This is why, he continues, 
Gorgias defined it as creator of persuasion59. The implied passage is Pl. Grg. 453a, but apart from 
that, the idea of moral neutrality evokes several other passages of Gorgias, such as 457b on the 
unjust use of rhetoric (ἀλλὰ <δεῖ> δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι) or Socrates’ objection in 
459e–461a. It is also reminiscent of Hel. 14 where the function of logoi to the human soul is likened 
to the various ways different drugs affect the human body. 
 
 
II. Argumentation structures 
 
In the context of Periclean Athens and after the turmoil caused by the Persian Wars deliberative 
discourse and public discussions were a sine qua non for emergent democracy. In the fifth century, 
argumentation relied chiefly on opposing statements and the necessity for discussing the 
alternatives was experienced by every Athenian on a daily basis. Weighing the possible competing 
alternatives (the art of dissoi logoi) was the main concern of antilogic, which was in turn connected 
to sophistic argument and figures like Protagoras and Gorgias60. Athens was a metropolitan culture 
exposing its youths to daily argumentative debates and giving them lifelong lessons in refutation61. 
Life in a self-regulating city-state called for participation in public life, which often gave rise to 
disputes. Citizens exercised their democratic rights within enshrined public institutions such as the 
                                                             
55 Chialva (2016) 21–2.  
56 Cf. Anderson (1993) 95–6 and 170. 
57 Nic. Prog. 1.2. 
58 Nic. Prog. 1.3. 
59 Nic. Prog. 1.3: διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ πειθοῦς δημιουργὸν ὁ Γοργίας ὡρίσατο. 
60 Mendelson (2002) 1–3, Kerferd (1981) 85. 
61 On antilogical pedagogy see Tindale (2010) 102-104 and Mendelson (2002) 171–2. A similar idea is reflected in 
Cic. De Or. 3.92 where Crassus reflects on the advantages of the controversiae in education. 
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Assembly and the law courts, where they needed to verbally persuade their fellow-citizens of the 
correctness of their views or prove their case just in front of the jury.   
 
 
II.I. Argument from probabilities (eikota) 
 
In the interest of persuasion, a speaker would need to enlist all his resources. When factual reality 
was irrecoverable and there was absence of witnesses, proof from probability was necessary62. The 
speaker tried to substitute likelihoods for facts63. This, however, does not mean that likelihood 
should be understood as necessarily opposite to factual truth64. Probabilistic argumentation is often 
regarded as an evolution first theorized in Sicily, with Tisias and/or Corax, the putative founders 
of rhetoric. Other thinkers, such as Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BCE) or Antiphon of Rhamnus 
(480–411 BCE) were also famous for their extended use of εἰκότα, a practice that was not always 
well-received65. Sophistic probability should not be confused with mathematical probability. It 
amounts to a personal determination based on what constitutes common experience and 
“commonly accepted knowledge about human behaviour”66. Protagoras, Gorgias and Antiphon 
often pushed the probabilistic argument to the extremes in order to show their conviction that 
factual reality cannot be determined and that a sophist should always be able to support by logos 
any thesis on the basis of what is likely67.  
 Gorgias’ Palamedes relies fundamentally on probability68. Palamedes was indeed innocent, 
but the lack of compelling evidence (ἄτεχνοι πίστεις) to persuade the jury renders factual reality 
                                                             
62 Rhet. Alex. 7. 1428a25–34. 
63 For this reason, when direct or unartful (ἄτεχνος) evidence is at hand there is only relative or supplementary 
probative value in what is likely; Tindale (2010) 61, 67, 71, 79.  
64 As in Pl. Phaedr. 273a where Socrates thinks that arguments from probability serve to manipulate the crowd. For 
an analogous criticism see Grg 464d-465d where Socrates denies Gorgias’ rhetoric the status of a techne and likens it 
to “baking pastry”; cf. Gagarin (1994) 56–7. 
65 In Pl. Phaedr. 273a–c, likelihood and truth are conceptualized by Socrates as binary opposites. See also Gagarin 
(1994) 51 on “reverse probabilities”. Similarly, Aristotle (Rhet. 1401a) makes a further distinction between kairotic 
sophistic probabilities, on the one hand, and ‘real’ probabilities, on the other, and censures Protagoras for using proof 
from likelihood and making the weak argument appear strong; Tindale (2010) 70–1. For Aristotle’s categorization of 
means of persuasion and the psychological effect of εἰκός arguments, see van Eemeren (2014) 118–19. 
66 Bons (2007) 41–42; Tindale (2010) 148–9 rightly points out that eikotic argumentation is audience-focused since 
its effectiveness relies on the ability of the arguer to understand the audience involved; likelihood has no significance 
if it falls outside of the grasp of a community. 
67 A good example is Antiphon’s first Tetralogy or even his court speech On the Murder of Herodes; Tindale (2010) 
75–6. 
68 For the use of eikos, see Tindale (2010) 76–7. 
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rather dormant. This does not mean that the sophist defied truth, as Plato suggested69; rather, he 
seemed to acknowledge that ‘what counts as valid is that which is persuasive in a given context, 
not that which adheres to objective rules of reasoning’70. In his defense, Gorgias furnishes 
likelihood-based evidence in relation to two crucial elements, power and will: a) if I (Palamedes) 
wanted to betray the Greeks, I could not because I did not have the ability (δύναμις; sections 6–
12) and b) even if I were able to become a traitor, I could not, because I had no such wish 
(βούλησις; sections 13–21). Odysseus’ accusation entails a series of suppositions which are all 
proven practically implausible (e.g. the hero was unlikely to communicate with the enemy side). 
In the second part, Palamedes turns to examining possible motives, driven by which he would 
commit treason (e.g. money or power); each and every one of them again turns out to be 
inconsistent with the hero’s character. In this light, I understand arguing from probability as the 
text’s governing argumentation strategy, in the service of which Gorgias engages every other 
means of persuasion.  
 
 
II.II. Argument from opposites 
 
The evidential value of arguing from antinomy consists in showing that a statement proves 
wrong if one assigns contradictory properties to it71.  In dialectic, it is also called the principle of 
the excluded middle suggesting for any proposition that either its affirmation or negation can only 
be true72. In order to prove that one proposition (Q) in relation to a certain entity or object is valid, 
one should prove that its opposite (-Q) is wrong73. In broader terms, arguing from antinomies can 
also amount to pointing out possible inconsistencies or contradictory premises in the argument of 
the opponent. In antilogical argumentation, this can often take the form of reverse-probability, a 
concept known as peritrope in rhetorical theory, a sort of ‘table-turning’ strategy. The main idea 
                                                             
69 Gagarin (1994) 49–50 and 56–57; see also Dodds (1959) 7–10 and Spatharas (2001) 397.  
70 Consigny (2001) 185. 
71 Besides eristic or antilogic, arguing from antinomy is described also as a dialectic procedure related to Socratic 
elenchos (Pl. Phaedr. 261d, Arist. Top.1.2, 8.4–5); Socrates initially secures the agreement of his interlocutor and then 
directs the discussion towards a contradiction that will serve to refute the opponent’s thesis; Kerferd (1981) 64–7, 
Tindale (2010) 48, and Liarou (2009) 39–41. 
72 Liarou (2009) 113; Arist. Metaph. 10005b, 1011b13 ff, and Post. Anal. 71a14, 88b1. Protagorean relativism clearly 
denies this law; Mendelson (2002) 22–23. 
73 Liarou (2009) 116. 
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is that a speaker turns a part of his adversary’s argument against him often leading to self-
contradiction74. 
 Gorgias deploys the law of the excluded middle in all his extant works and not less so in 
Palamedes: 
 
You have accused me, in the speeches I have mentioned, of two things that are completely contrary to 
one another, craftiness (σοφία) and madness (μανία), of which it is not possible for the same man to 
possess both. For you accuse me of craftiness when you say that I am skilled, clever, and resourceful, but 
of madness when you say that I betrayed Greece.                                                                             Pal. 25 
 
The hero refutes Odysseus’ accusation on the grounds of assigning two conflicting elements (i.e. 
σοφία and μανία) to one and the same person. However, the argument is cogent only within 
Palamedes’ conceptual and ethical premises, where μανία is described by the hero as attempting 
impossible, useless, and disgraceful things, which will benefit the enemy and harm the friend75. 
Otherwise, madness and wisdom are not two elements necessarily mutually exclusive. A wise 
speaker may use his wisdom (here constructed as craftiness, skill, and resourcefulness) for 
malevolent purposes76.   
 
 
II.III Apagoge / Reductio ad absurdum 
 
The apagogic method (ἀπαγωγή) is also used to indirectly prove a statement by demonstrating the 
absurdity or impossibility of the contrary. It is another modality of antilogical argumentation often 
resembling the argument from antinomies. In its simplest form, an apagoge is a series of 
concessions to the opponent’s proposition whose inevitable consequences lead to impossible 
inferences. In extended rhetorical discourse, a speaker starts by conceding that the idea of his 
opponent is true. Now, this concession generates a series of necessary propositions, whose 
probative value is in turn scrutinized and refuted. All possible emerging assumptions appear to 
falter in the light of the absurdities they entail. In retrospect, the initial argument proves 
improbable.  
                                                             
74 For the term, its use in Pl. Theaetetus, and its variants see Tindale (2010) 83–97.  
75 Pal. 25. 
76 Spatharas (2001) 401. 
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 Gorgias’ Palamedes makes the most exhaustive use of apagoge in the extant Greek 
literature. A brief example will make this clearer. In section 9, Palamedes concedes the possibility 
that he committed treachery motivated by money (P). If this premise is true, then one of the 
following propositions should also be true: Palamedes either received a great amount of money 
(Q) or he received a small amount of money (–Q). –Q is impossible since a small amount of money 
is unlikely (οὐκ εἰκός) to be worth one’s great services; on the other hand, Q presupposes that the 
money was somehow transported. If so, then it was either Palamedes and someone else that did 
the job (Q1), or many men (Q2). Neither is plausible, since two men would not have carried much 
and if many were involved there would have been witnesses. Since neither Q1 nor Q2 are true, 
then Q is by no means true. And consequently, if neither –Q nor Q are true, then P is also not true. 
This example is part of a larger apagoge populating the whole first part of the speech. The hero’s 
incapability of committing treason is proven on the basis of the serial absurdities inferred by 
conceding the opposite proposition. Schematically, the speaker selects and divides his material in 
a ‘chain’77.   
 
 
III. The Mysian narrative (Her. 23.2–30) 
 
III.I. Putting the record straight 
 
[Phoenician] What is this about the shield, vinedresser? It has never yet been told of by any poet, nor 
does it figure in any account of the Trojan War.            Her. 14.1 
 
After a barrage of first-hand information about bodies and bones of giant heroes (Her. 8), the 
vinedresser goes on to disclose the truth about the Shield of Telephus. The Phoenician 
acknowledges Protesilaus as a more trustworthy witness twice (‘I believe you, vinedresser—by 
Protesilaus, I do’78; ‘from now on, vinedresser, I shall be on your side, and allow no one to doubt 
such stories’79) in the course of an intermediate discussion about Protesilaus’ advice to suppliants 
at his sanctuary (14.1–17.6) and about recent apparitions of heroes at Troy (18.1–23.1). What 
follows is a retelling of the story of the Battle at Mysia with a series of new elements and 
supplementations:  
                                                             
77 Consigny (2001) 187. See also Bermúdez (2017) 16–18 and especially 17 n. 18.   
78 Her. 16.6. 
79 ibid. 18.1. 
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ἈΜΠ. Οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ φρονεῖς οὕτω, αἴρωμεν ἐξ Αὐλίδος, ὦ ξένε. τὸ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ξυνειλέχθαι σφας 
ἀληθές. τὰ δ’ ἐμβατήρια τοῦ λόγου τῷ Πρωτεσίλεῳ εὔχθω. ὡς μὲν δὴ τὴν Μυσίαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ πρὸ Τροίας 
ἐπόρθησαν ἐπὶ Τηλέφῳ τότε οὖσαν, καὶ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μαχόμενος ἐτρώθη ὑπὸ 
Ἀχιλλέως, ἔστι σοι καὶ ποιητῶν ἀκούειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκλέλειπται αὐτοῖς ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ πιστεύειν ὡς 
ἀγνοήσαντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν χώραν τὰ τοῦ Πριάμου ἄγειν τε καὶ φέρειν ᾤοντο, διαβάλλει τὸν Ὁμήρου 
λόγον ὃν περὶ Κάλχαντος ᾄδει τοῦ μάντεως· εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ μαντικῇ ἔπλεον καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἡγεμόνα 
ἐποιοῦντο, πῶς ἂν ἄκοντες ἐκεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν; πῶς δ’ ἂν καθορμισθέντες ἠγνόησαν ὅτι μὴ ἐς Τροίαν 
ἥκουσι, καὶ ταῦτα πολλοῖς μὲν βουκόλοις ἐντετυχηκότες, πολλοῖς δὲ ποιμέσι; νέμεταί τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα 
μέχρι θαλάσσης καὶ τοὔνομα ἐρωτᾶν τῆς ξένης ξύνηθες, οἶμαι, τοῖς καταπλέουσιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ μηδενὶ 
τούτων ἐνέτυχον, μηδὲ ἤροντο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ Ὀδυσσεύς γε καὶ Μενέλεως ἐς Τροίαν ἤδη 
ἀφιγμένω τε καὶ πεπρεσβευκότε καὶ τὰ κρήδεμνα τοῦ Ἰλίου εἰδότε, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσι περιιδεῖν ταῦτα, 
οὐδ’ ἂν ξυγχωρῆσαι τῷ στρατῷ διαμαρτάνοντι τῆς πολεμίας. ἑκόντες μὲν δὴ οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ τοὺς Μυσοὺς 
ἐληίζοντο, λόγου ἐς αὐτοὺς ἥκοντος ὡς ἄριστα ἠπειρωτῶν πράττοιεν, καί πῃ καὶ δεδιότες μὴ πρόσοικοι 
τῷ Ἰλίῳ ὄντες ἐς κοινωνίαν τῶν κινδύνων μετακληθῶσι. 
 
[Vinedresser] Since you feel that way, stranger, let us set sail from Aulis—for the story that they 
mustered there first is true—and let the embarkation offerings for our story be made to Protesilaus. 
Now, that before Troy the Achaeans ravaged Mysia, which was then under Telephus’ rule, and that 
Telephus was wounded by Achilles while fighting to defend his people, you can learn even from the 
poets; for they have not left out this part. But to believe that the Achaeans, in ignorance of the country, 
thought they were plundering Priam’s land, does an injustice to Homer’s account of Calchas the 
prophet. For if they sailed after consulting a seer and made his skill their guide, then how could they 
have landed in Mysia unwillingly? And even when they had landed, how could they not have known 
they came to Troy, although they encountered many cowherds and shepherds? For the country is 
inhabited right to the coast, and of course those who arrive somewhere by sea customarily ask the name 
of the foreign country. But even if they met no one, and asked no such questions, still Odysseus and 
Menelaus, who had both already gone to Troy as ambassadors, and had known the battlements of Ilium, 
do not seem to me to have stood by or to have allowed the army to miss the enemy completely. No, the 
Achaeans were raiding Mysia deliberately, since word had reached them that these were the wealthiest 
people on the mainland, probably also because they were afraid that, since they were Troy’s neighbors, 
the Mysians would be summoned to join in the war.       Her. 23.4–8 
 
 
In the current passage, the vinedresser for the first time engages personally in criticizing older 
accounts of the Trojan campaign. In terms of stasis theory, that is, an invention process of rhetoric 
whereby the main issues or challenges emerging in a debate are determined by the defense80, the 
main crisis in this particular scenario comes down to the following: Did the Achaeans sack Mysia 
deliberately (ἑκόντες) or in ignorance (ἀγνοήσαντες)? The vinedresser agrees with the poets that 
the Achaeans sacked Mysia before Troy, during the reign of Telephus, who was injured by Achilles 
(fact)81. He also agrees that this operation is best described as a ‘plunder’ since the Achaeans 
actually fought this people (definition).  However, there is an objection as to whether or not there 
                                                             
80 For stasis theory see Marsh (2005) 41–6. 
81 Contrary to Gorgias’ Palamedes, where the probabilistic argument primarily challenges facts (stasis coniecturalis): 
Palamedes did not commit treason at all.   
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was a motive behind this plunder: Did the Achaeans actually mistook the land for Troy? At this 
point, the vinedresser raises a stasis qualitatis, that is, an objection regarding the quality of action 
and actor (Was there a motivation? Is the act justified?). His contention is that the Achaeans knew 
that this was not Troy and plundered it nonetheless, and therefore they should be held responsible 
for the pillage of Mysia.  
 Let us now examine how the aforementioned patterns of argumentation are implemented 
here to support this stasis. Supposedly, the Achaeans consulted a seer, Calchas, whom they made 
their guide to Troy. To suggest that the Achaeans were ignorant of their act downplays the status, 
which Homer credits to Calchas, says the vinedresser. The implied intertext here is Il. 1.68–7282, 
where Calchas is called ἄριστος μάντις (excellent seer); his comprehensive knowledge of the past, 
present, and future made him lead the Achaeans to Troy. To accept that the Achaeans, according 
to the poets, were ignorant of the land, presupposes that the person who guided them was ignorant 
too. But ignorance (Q) and prophetic knowledge (–Q) are two mutually exclusive elements, which 
cannot be assigned to one entity (i.e. Calchas). From this antinomy we infer that the Achaeans 
could not plunder Mysia unknowingly83. 
 Now this mode of arguing from antinomies operates in tandem with apagogical deduction. 
The following step is to assume that the Achaeans plundered Mysia in ignorance (A) (note the 
concessive πῶς δ’ ἂν καθορμισθέντες ἠγνόησαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐντετυχηκότες). This proposition 
entails a few other occurrences: as soon as they landed, the men would inevitably bump into local 
herdsmen and shepherds (A1), whom they would ask about the name of the foreign land, as per 
custom (A2); the locals would say this is the land of Telephus and the ignorant Achaeans would 
have left in peace. But even if we accept that they did not meet anyone, continues the vinedresser 
with a further concession (note the use of the counterfactual conditional), had they not seen the 
city before? Menelaus and Odysseus had been to Troy as ambassadors and had got sight of the 
city’s battlements; if they had wanted to stay in peace with this people, they would have 
discouraged the Achaeans from attacking (A3)84. Consequently, the initial proposition is proven 
wrong and the inference is: ἑκόντες μὲν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ τοὺς Μυσοὺς ἐληίζοντο. 
                                                             
82 See also Grossardt (2006) ad loc.  
83 Or that Homer’s definition of the excellent seer is not very accurate. But this is not the contention here. In chapter 
3, we will see that Philostratus might indeed have a different understanding of prophetic knowledge than Homer. 
84 The reference to this mission has no validity though, since the negotiatory mission must have taken place after the 
battle at Mysia. There is no reason to assume that Odysseus and Menelaus first visited Priam and before fighting in 
Troy went to Mysia; Grossardt (2006) 468. 
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 The idea that the Achaeans meant to plunder Mysia (ἑκόντες) resonates with the second 
thesis in Palamedes’ defense: οὔτε δυνάμενος ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν τοιούτοις (nor, even if 
I had been able to, would I have wished to do so)85. Contrary to Palamedes, who was neither 
capable nor willing, the Achaeans were both capable of ransacking Mysia and willing to profit 
from its commodities. It is also impossible that they were ignorant of the land (πῶς δ’ ἂν 
καθορμισθέντες ἠγνόησαν ὅτι μὴ ἐς Τροίαν ἥκουσι) since Odysseus and Menelaus knew the 
battlements of Ilium (τὰ κρήδεμνα τοῦ Ἰλίου εἰδότε). The polarity ἀγνοεῖν/εἰδέναι is instrumental 
in delineating the grounds on which Odysseus crafted his false indictment in Palamedes86.   
Notably, the vinedresser engages personally in refuting the older accounts while he might 
as well rely on Protesilaus’ omniscience to present the story about the Shield of Telephus87. Instead, 
Philostratus chooses to actively involve his main narrator and his interlocutor in an argumentative 
mode. Protesilaus might have achieved supreme knowledge when his soul was detached from his 
body88, but his role is not to divulge all his divine wisdom. It is important that the rationalizing 
practice be conducted in present time by the two characters of the here and now, independently of 
an external authority. What Philostratus cares for is not so much to present an objective truth 
contradicting that of Homer, but rather to implicate his readers in interacting with traditional 
accounts while adopting themselves the role of interpreter. While interacting with the older 
accounts the vinedresser states: οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσι περιιδεῖν ταῦτα (it does not seem to me that 
they (i.e. Menelaus and Odysseus) would have tolerated these things) implying that this is his 
personal opinion and therefore the truth he is sharing is partisan and perspectival. 
 From a narratological perspective, Philostratus routinely has the vinedresser depend on 
Protesilaus’ authoritative knowledge and convey his informant’s truth based on what the hero 
‘saw’ or ‘considered true’ (embedded or secondary focalization)89; but now that the vinedresser 
holds the fort of argumentation, he becomes the primary focalizer90.  His focalization transpires 
from the absence of indirect discourse in the vinedresser’s speech (formerly premised on an 
                                                             
85 Gorg. Pal. 5. 
86 A characteristic passage is Pal. 5: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ σαφῶς <εἰδὼς> ὁ κατήγορος κατηγορεῖ μου, σαφῶς οἶδα· σύνοιδα 
γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σαφῶς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον πεποιηκώς· οὐδὲ οἶδ’ ὅπως ἂν εἰδείη τις ὂν τὸ μὴ γενόμενον. εἰ δὲ οἰόμενος οὕτω 
ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν […] (Well, that the accuser has accused me without knowing 
clearly—this I know clearly. For I am clearly aware that I have done nothing of this sort. And I do not know in what 
way someone could know that what has not happened exists. But if it is because he supposes that this is how things 
were that he has made the accusation […]).   
87 Rusten (2014) 172n. 
88 Her. 7.3. 
89 For the term see de Jong (2014) 50-56. 
90 de Jong (2014) 20 and 49. 
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implicit ‘Protesilaus says’ or ‘he agrees with X’). This said, shift in focalization entails shift in 
allocation of authority. 
 
 
III.II. From ‘Refutation’ of Homer to verisimilar truths 
 
Heroicus belongs to a tradition of texts. which purport to refine or supplement older accounts of 
the Trojan War, the most prominent of which were Homer’s poems and fifth-century tragedy91. By 
way of fiction, authors like Philostratus relied on various rhetorical methods in order to assert their 
own account’s credibility: eyewitness, historiographical tropes, archaeological evidence etc. One 
of these media is the argument from probability. Often the implied author claims to have access to 
supreme authorities serving to authenticate the framing narrative of these stories by disclosing a 
ground-breaking truth. This idea of ‘revising’ Homer should not, however, be taken at face value. 
It rather amounts to an interpretative practice of modernizing or rationalizing the Homeric myth 
(and the medium of epic) in order to serve certain literary or philosophical purposes or define the 
author’s ideals, values and beliefs by reference to the past.  
Paradoxically, in Philostratus’ case, this practice ultimately reaffirms rather than 
downplays Homer as an authoritative source. Given the characteristic backward impetus that 
drives Heroicus’ subject matter (i.e. heroes of the Trojan War) Homer is the ideal source for 
redefining Hellenic identity by means of its exemplary heroic value. Let us take Palamedes as an 
example, a theme introduced here and studied in more depth in the following chapter. Palamedes 
emerges as the most appalling and deliberate omission by Homer for the sake of Odysseus. The 
new story of Palamedes makes sense or is more plausible only under the assumption that Homer 
knew about him and deliberately suppressed his actions supposedly to promote Odysseus92. This 
automatically situates the relationship of Palamedes and Odysseus in an oppositional context. In 
other words, the idea of re-creating the Trojan narrative based on what Homer did not say or what 
Homer purposefully omitted acknowledges Homer as the fixed point, in relation to which Heroicus 
develops its themes, values, beliefs centripetally. The assertion that the vinedresser (drawing upon 
Protesilaus) can rationalize or even refute Homer’s story or aletheia grants ipso facto authority to 
his account.  
                                                             
91 Cf. Dio Chrys. Or. 11, Lucian’s Vera historia, Dictys of Crete’s Ephemeris Belli Troiani etc.  
92 Her. 14.3, 24.2. 
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 In Heroicus, the source of this ultimate knowledge is Protesilaus, who died first at Troy 
and after his soul was detached from the body and its diseases, it communed with the divine and 
became an expert in Homer’s poetry. This type of truth is deemed as divine, absolute, final, and 
objectified. However, the ghost of Protesilaus is silent. The knowledge that stems from him is 
mediated through the vinedresser, who, despite his sophisticated education, fails to fully convey 
the truth of his informant; many things Protesilaus denies to reveal, many he does not know, while 
in many cases we cannot discern if the narrator presents Protesilaus’ standpoint or projects his 
personal ideas. In the Mysian section, as we saw, the vinedresser somewhat breaks away from his 
source and argues autonomously. Consequently, we cannot only talk about a single authority or a 
singular truth. Truth is also partisan, constructed, and contingent upon the Phoenician’s 
acquiescence, acting as the community. Unless the interlocutor’s initial disbelief and doubts are 
overcome, truth has no value.  
 The vinedresser’s commitment to initiate the Phoenician into the truth of Protesilaus93 
triggers off the Shield narrative. The latter establishes a series of innovations in the myth preceding 
the Trojan War: i) the Greeks did not mistake Mysia for Troy (as we read in Cypria) and they 
ransacked it to exploit its wealth or to prevent future alliance with Troy (23.8), ii) the Battle at 
Mysia was the greatest contest for the Greeks, greater than both those at Troy and any other 
subsequent war between Greeks and barbarians (23.12), iii) Palamedes displayed great valor in 
killing Haimus along with Sthenelus and Diomedes (23.22), iv) it was Protesilaus who fought and 
disarmed Telephus, and Achilles who gave the final blow (23.24), v) the leader of the Mysian 
women who fought alongside the men, Hiera, was more beautiful (a Trojan?) than Helen. 
 In order for these novelties to be accepted, the vinedresser needs to afford Protesilaus’ 
account a good degree of verisimilitude, so that it appears (ἔοικε) closer to what the Phoenician 
(or third-century society and readership) is willing to accept as true (see below). Let us briefly 
pinpoint a few factors that are conducive to these truths. As in any other case, Protesilaus is our 
main informant, but by time of conflict with the Mysians the hero was still alive, and therefore, 
had not yet acquired the authoritative knowledge he got later at Troy. What we have here, is a 
firsthand testimony of a man at war, not very different from the journal of Idomeneus’ companion, 
which Dictys of Crete used as source to assert his own version of the Trojan War94. In addition, 
                                                             
93 Ibid. 7.8. 
94 Dué–Nagy (2004) 54. 
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the main battle narrative is ‘framed with rationalist, historiographical markers’95. The polemical 
tone as well as the formulaic assertion of ‘a battle surpassing all other wars fought between 
Hellenes and barbarians’ are only two indications of how the historiographical perspective is 
adopted here. This is how Herodotus begins his own Histories with the listing of the mythical and 
historical conflicts between Greeks and their eastern neighbors96. Thucydides, too, appropriates 
the same topos to justify his engagement in writing the history of the internecine conflict between 
the Peloponnesians and the Athenians97.  
 As in Palamedes, εἰκός is crucial in lending the account credibility. Arguing from 
probabilities serves to disprove a logos construed as false and deceptive98, whether that be 
Odysseus’ false accusations or the ‘poetic lies’ about the Trojan War. Notably, Odysseus is seen 
in terribly unfavorable light in either of these scenarios99. Let us not forget that the most notorious 
lie of Homer, according to Protesilaus, was the Odyssey. In Gorgias’ model defense speech, factual 
reality is unattainable due to absence of witnesses. Additionally, on Gorgias’ own epistemological 
terms, it is impossible for logos (language) to describe the specificity of external realities, a 
conundrum Palamedes addresses already at the outset of his defense100. In Philostratus’ fictional 
account of the Trojan War, factual reality is difficult to attain because of the vast perennial 
ἔκπληξις (awe) the poems of Homer have caused to readers101. To speak about the truth is the 
opposite of becoming oblivious102 and this is precisely what this section aims to achieve. At the 
end of this story we learn about certain figures and one strife that are more memorable than what 
Homer and the poets mischievously imprinted to our memories. In a typically sophistic way, the 
author engages in making the minor statement appear as major, but in a way that that facilitates 
rather than vitiates his truth. 
 
                                                             
95 Whitmarsh (2009) 210. 
96 Her. 1.1; Grossardt (2006) ad loc.  
97 Thuc. 1.1. 
98 Consigny (2001) 52. 
99 Note that both Gorgias’ Palamedes and Philsotratus’ Heroicus grapple with setting right the falsehoods of Odysseus. 
Gorgias does not explicitly engage in Homeric criticism like Philostratus, but it would not be inconceivable that 
Philostratus read both Helen and Palamedes as responses to Homeric epic and the truths it established. This is in line 
with the fundamental questions of faith, belief, and truth, which Heroicus raises and which are emphasized in view of 
all those texts, including Gorgias, aiming to revise the Trojan tale (Schwindelliteratur). 
100 In section 4, ἀλήθεια along with ἀνάγκη (constraint) are called ‘teachers who provide more risks than resources’ 
(διδασκάλων ἐπικινδυνοτέρων ἢ ποριμωτέρων); cf. Pal. 35 and Hel. 11; see also Gorgias’ On-non being where the 
third thesis about being, is that even if we understand it we cannot communicate it to our neighbors.  
101 Her. 14 (cf. 24). 
102 Ἀλήθεια derives from privative prefix ἀ– and λήθη, which means forgetfulness. 
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CHAPTER III 
Re-enacting Palamedes’ defense 
 
Interpretation and revision are two activities informing a great deal of Imperial literature. We often 
see Second Sophistic authors invest the characters of their stories with hermeneutic vigor. Earlier 
we saw in Heroicus that the narrative voice of the vinedresser, acting as the mouthpiece of 
Protesilaus, engages in the process of ‘correcting’ older accounts of the Trojan tale, and 
predominantly that of Homer.  
 This chapter is concerned with myth per se and focuses on how Philostratus steers the 
reader to construct the image of the cultured (pepaideumenos) through the figure of Palamedes. 
The ancient reader – familiar with the Classical canon of texts – is actively involved in this process. 
In our discussion, we will approach section 33 of Heroicus as a re-enactment of Palamedes’ 
apology refined with further sophistic details103. My argument is as follows: in a series of vignettes, 
which take the form of (sophistic) debate between Palamedes (protagonist) and Odysseus 
(antagonist or foil), the author engages certain themes and a literary exemplum, which link 
Palamedes with Gorgias.  By Gorgias we should not only think of the sophist and his writings per 
se but also what had been established in collective memory as ‘Gorgianic’ through cultural 
transmission. This said, aside from the sophist’s fragments, we will also consider ancient 
testimonia and literary adaptations (e.g. Plato’s dialogues). 
 The questions I am raising are: a) what are the qualities constituting the portrait of the 
pepaideumenos? and b) how does Philostratus shape his Palamedes in ways that make him share 
common intellectual ground with Gorgias? How is this foil activated in the text? I will investigate 
these questions on the basis of the following three focal points: Ι. inventio or εὕρεσις, ΙΙ. 
intellectual φθόνος, and ΙΙΙ. the appropriation of the medicine–rhetoric exemplum from Plato’s 
Gorgias. My aim by establishing these communalities here is to clear the grounds for evaluating 
how the strategy of referencing certain authorities is effective for Philostratus’ own definition of 
sophia (chapter 4). Before I take up these questions, I wish to give a synopsis of the five vignettes, 
which frame our inquiries. 
 
                                                             
103 The translation is by Rusten (2014) adapted. The text is de Lannoy’s (1977). 
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I. Heroicus 33: mind-fights and the Achaeans 
 
The first vignette (33.5–9) starts with a solar eclipse at Troy. The Achaeans worry that a divine 
sign (διοσημίαν) for things to come is at issue. Palamedes provides a scientific explanation 
(διεξῆλθε) of the natural phenomenon, justifies why the portent will be against the Trojans and not 
the Achaeans, and advises the army to pray and sacrifice a colt. The Achaeans praise him (τῶν 
Ἀχαιῶν ἐπαινεσάντων) and seem fully persuaded by his reasoning (καὶ γὰρ ἥττηντο τῶν τοῦ 
Παλαμήδους λόγων). Then, Odysseus warns Palamedes to refrain from advising on divination and 
heavenly matters, Palamedes refutes him, and Odysseus leaves full of rage. The story closes with 
Palamedes preparing himself for future malignancies on the part of Odysseus (ὡς πρὸς 
βασκαίνοντα ἤδη παρασκευάζων ἑαυτόν).  
 The second vignette (33.10–12) takes place in an ἐκκλησία (assembly). Some cranes are 
flying in their customary formation. Odysseus observes that the birds call the Greeks to witness 
(μαρτύρονται τοὺς Ἀχαιούς) that it is them who discovered the alphabet and not Palamedes. 
Palamedes refutes him by judging him incompetent of understanding and interpreting the divine 
order (οὐδὲν ἂν περὶ τάξεως εἴποις). 
 A follow-up parenthetical section (33.13) comprises a remark by the vinedresser on 
Odysseus’ growing emotions. The hero is nurturing φθόνος (envy), because he has been made to 
look childish in the assembly by someone younger (μειρακιώδης δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας δόξας καὶ 
πρεσβύτερος νέου τοῦ Παλαμήδους ἡττηθείς). His plan is to turn Agamemnon against Palamedes, 
a rising rival. 
 The third vignette (33.14–18) opens with wolves attacking the Achaean camp. This conflict 
simulates an agôn logôn, but only Palamedes’ argument is fully developed. Odysseus proposes to 
wipe out the pack at Mt Ida. Palamedes judges that Apollo uses the wolves to foretell the upcoming 
plague (προοίμιον λοιμοῦ ποιεῖται104), so that they will take precautions. Then, he continues with 
a twofold advice: first, the Achaeans should pray to Apollo to avert the plague (religious advice), 
and, then, take themselves some proactive steps towards a light diet and vigorous movements 
(διαίτης λεπτῆς καὶ κινήσεων συντόνων105) (physical advice). The vinedresser describes all these 
at length. He also gives as much attention to the assembly’s full adherence to Palamedes’ words; 
not only were the Achaeans fully persuaded, but they also thought each of his words as θεῖον 
                                                             
104 Her. 33.14.7. 
105 Ibid. 33.14.15. 
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(divine) and χρησμῶδες (oracular)106 . Palamedes gains the full trust of the community and proves 
competent of understanding, handling, and resolving effectively a problem that would put the 
entire army in jeopardy. He remains pious all the same. For these reasons, adds the vinedresser, 
Palamedes was awarded the prize of wisdom (σοφίας ἀριστεῖα ἐστεφανοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων107), 
“while Odysseus felt shamed, and turned all his villainy (πανουργίας) against him”108. 
 By the last extended vignette (33.20–37), all conditions have matured towards the foul plot. 
The important episodes are as follows: Achilles requests to campaign against the islands and the 
coastal cities together with Palamedes, during which Palamedes instructs Achilles in tactics by 
calming and rousing him when necessary (33.20–23); there follows a series of distinctions and 
achievements in battle – alien to the hero’s ethos as shown in older accounts. In the meantime, 
Odysseus brainwashes Agamemnon against Palamedes (33.24–27). The Achaeans accuse him of 
bribery and treason, and the Peloponnesians along with the Ithacans stone him to death. 
Agamemnon issues an edict that forbids burying or sanctifying the corpse; Ajax opposes and buries 
him, Achilles returns and composes an ode to the hero’s memory.  
 
 
ΙI. Inventio or εὕρεσις 
 
II.I. Palamedes 
 
As tradition wants, Palamedes was a prime mythic inventor109. His most exquisite achievement 
was arguably the invention of the alphabet110. In the second vignette (see above), Odysseus is 
presented to challenge this tradition by attributing this invention to the cranes (αὐταὶ <γέρανοι> 
γράμματα εὗρον, οὐχὶ σύ111). However, the antagonist, who challenges the authenticity of his 
rival’s intellectual pursuits, fails because of his incapacity to offer an accurate interpretation:  
                                                             
106 Ibid. 33.15.5. This adjective appears only here and in VA 6.11, where Apollonius expounds on Pythagoras’ doctrine 
and wisdom in front of Thespesion and other Egyptians. Pythagoras’ wisdom is called ἄρρητος (ineffable) and his 
philosophy χρησμώδης and άληθής (true). In this section, Apollonius explains that he rejected all other philosophical 
doctrines because they were centered on pleasure and passions. The main elements of Pythagoras’ philosophy 
emphasized here is vegetarianism and abstinence from pleasure. In the passage from our text, the Achaeans take 
Palamedes’ words as oracles right after the hero has suggested his proactive plan including a vegetarian diet. In this 
sense, Palamedes’ wisdom borrows from the thaumaturge’s extraordinary sophia.   
107 Ibid. 33.19.1. 
108 Ibid. 33.19.2–4. 
109 Ibid. 33.1.3–6; Grossardt (2009) ad Kapitel 33 and ad 33.1 (571–574).  
110 Stesich. PMGF 213, Eur. fr. 578 Kannicht, Gorg. Pal. 30, but also Philostr. VA 3.22.2 and 4.33. 
111 Her. 33.10.4–5. 
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καὶ ὁ Παλαμήδης “ἐγὼ γράμματα οὐχ εὗρον” εἶπεν, “ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν εὑρέθην· πάλαι γὰρ ταῦτα ἐν 
Μουσῶν οἴκῳ κείμενα ἐδεῖτο ἀνδρὸς τοιούτου, θεοὶ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δι’ ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν ἀναφαίνουσι. 
γέρανοι μὲν οὖν οὐ μεταποιοῦνται γραμμάτων ἀλλὰ τάξιν ἐπαινοῦσαι πέτονται· […] σὺ δ’ οὐδὲν ἂν 
περὶ τάξεως εἴποις· ἀτακτεῖς γὰρ τὰς μάχας.” 
 
Palamedes answered, “I did not discover writing—I was discovered by writing, since it had long been 
stored in the house of the Muses waiting for the right man; the gods make known such things through 
wise men. The cranes, however, do not claim to make letters; they show their admiration for military 
order and arrangement in their flight; but then, arrangement is something you cannot speak of at all, 
since you always ignore it in battle.”                                                                  Her. 33.11.1–8 
 
The hero’s response implies the claim that no function arose out of individual behavior. Palamedes 
did not actually invent the letters; rather, he was discovered by them by acting as an intermediate 
agent between humans and the Muses. Despite this crucial change in form, the meaning of 
Palamedes’ utterance is not essentially different from that of Odysseus. On the level of semantics, 
this shift in agencies serves to distinguish between inventing and discovering the letters, but the 
main point is that Palamedes did come up with the alphabet anyways. Yet, there is more to it than 
meets the eye. The negative potential optative (οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποις) serves to establish that Odysseus 
is completely disqualified from talking about these matters, as he is ignorant of τάξις. Even though 
the term here is used in its military sense, ‘arrangement’ and ‘order’ are concepts that informed 
the broader agenda of a sophist like Philostratus and I believe that the author does not mean his 
reader to pass this by. Like inventio, τάξις or dispositio was a crucial component in rhetorical 
theory signifying the proper arrangement of arguments (in this respect following inventio). Yet, it 
was a key element in astronomy.  A good example can be derived from the third book of Vita 
Apollonii, where, in section 53, the author uses the term twice: first to describe the experienced 
naval discipline or skill of Nearchus, Alexander’s fleet commander ([…] Νέαρχον οὐκ 
ἀγύμναστον τῆς θαλαττίου τάξεως), and second, to make a comment on how astral positions look 
unnatural to someone who observes them from the Red Sea (οἵ τε ἐπίδηλοι τῶν ἀστέρων 
ἐξαλλάττοιεν τῆς ἑαυτῶν τάξεως). Order and arrangement apply to aesthetics and mathematics 
too112. Within the intellectual circle of Julia Domna, where Philostratus interacted with many Neo-
Pythagoreans, mathematicians, natural philosophers etc.113, it is reasonable to assume that the 
notion of τάξις often covered a broader nexus of meanings. In this light, Odysseus’ lack of τάξις 
                                                             
112 Aristotle presents symmetry and definiteness as the main two forms of beauty and notes that the mathematical 
sciences demonstrate these two forms to the highest degree: τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ 
ὡρισμένον, ἃ μάλιστα δεικνύουσιν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι (Metaph. 1078ba36–b2). 
113 Philostr. VA 1.3; Aitken – Maclean (2001) xlvi, and Bowie (2009) 20. 
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implies the hero’s general incapacity to behave and act in a way that complies with nature, contrary 
to Palamedes. He failed to grasp the solar phenomenon before, he does not see how cranes ‘show 
their admiration for order’ now, and for the most part his arguments and conduct are disorderly.  
 On the level of pragmatics, the fact that we as readers are asked to acknowledge no 
autonomous agency behind the invention of the alphabet, reduces the degree of the actor’s 
reflexivity and makes the discovery of the alphabet seem like a natural consequence. The agent in 
this case implements a sort of indirect control over his own behavior, which purges him from every 
moral or ethical involvement in the given situation.  While the hero refrains from directly crediting 
himself with the invention of the letters, he nonetheless manages to create an effective character-
based argument by saying that he is the wise man, whom the gods chose to reveal their wisdom 
through. He was chosen to perceive and interpret the signs of nature’s wisdom and organize these 
natural abstractions into comprehensible systems. Thanks to him, humanity reached a higher level 
of civilization114.  
 Interestingly, Philostratus adjusts Palamedes’ realization to a moderate rhetorical style. 
Inasmuch as the broader subject matter of the text is religious, the hero is cast as a humble 
companion of the god, hence the use of the passive voice. At first glance, this more self-effacing 
formulation is somewhat at variance with the assertive language culture heroes traditionally use to 
talk about their benefactions. A good example is Prometheus bound115: at 436–471, the main hero 
compares the previous state of humanity, whose understanding of things was infantile (νηπίους 
ὄντας τὸ πρὶν), to the level of intelligence it reached after Prometheus’ gifts (ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ 
φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους). The first-person point of view in the active voice evinces the agent’s 
immediate consciousness of his cultural activity and intention: he did it out of good will (εὔνοιαν 
ἐξηγούμενος)116. Prometheus emphasizes on his ego (I showed them (ἐγὼ ἔδειξα) the hard-to-
discern risings and settings of stars)117 and asseverates his originality (And I was the first (πρῶτος) 
to bring beasts under the yoke)118.  
 In the case of Palamedes, the emergence of the alphabet was a process of guided ἀνεύρεσις, 
a fact that legitimately led Grossardt119 to compare this passage of Heroicus to the Platonic 
                                                             
114 As we saw, in Gorgias’ Palamedes the παροιχόμενος βίος of the hero (20, 28) furnished an ethotic alibi against 
Odysseus’ accusations of treachery. 
115 But also fr. 181a and 182 Radt, Eur. Fr. 578 Kannicht, Gorg. Pal. 30, and Her. 33.1.   
116Aesch. PV 446. 
117 457–8. 
118 462. 
119 Grossardt (2006) ad 33.11. 
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epistemological theory of recollection as formulated in Men. 81c–86c. A crucial difference is that, 
unlike Socrates, who leads an ordinary slave to solving the geometrical problem, Philostratus’ 
Palamedes stands out for his special inventional capacities. To highlight the importance of the 
outstanding individual’s beneficent activity (chosen by the Gods) adds more depth to Palamedes’ 
sophistic portrait. Sophists were also known for their interest in linguistic thought; Aristotle says 
for Protagoras that he was the first to distinguish the genders of nouns120. Gorgias was the first to 
create analytical word lists121. The invention of the alphabet may from a semiotic point of view 
correspond to the assiduous studies the sophists did on language.  
 Previously, in the Mysian narrative, the vinedresser said that Tlepolemus dispatched a ship 
to Telephus to inform him about the Achaeans as ‘letters had not yet been found’ (γράμματα γὰρ 
οὔπω εὕρητο)122. The prime narrator here adheres to traditional conceptions of heuresis, which, 
however, are in contradiction to the episode with the cranes, where the letters appear as already 
there. The heuresis of the letters by Palamedes is in line with his natural inclination to sophia, a 
theme permeating the entire rivalry section and thus attesting its autonomy. Therefore, we should 
not be taken aback by such inconsistencies, which, to an extent, are unavoidable, if we consider 
the different perspectives deployed in each of the narratives; the historiographical, rationalist 
approach has nothing to do with reanimating intellectual quarrels of sophists framed with heroic 
texture.   
  Another significant invention by Palamedes was the game of backgammon, a game 
requiring skill and concentration123. At Her. 20.2 Ajax’ ghost appears in his own tomb where two 
shepherds are playing backgammon and asks them to stop in affliction. The ghost remembers 
Palamedes and its conscience is troubled because Odysseus had wronged both the living Ajax and 
his close friend. The heroes are seen as miserable co-sufferers124.  The expression Ajax uses for 
Odysseus’ machination is ἄδικον εὑρὼν κρίσιν. The same term is used by Odysseus to describe 
his own plot against Palamedes later on: εὕρηται δέ μοι κατ’ αὐτοῦ τέχνη125.  
 Resourcefulness and ingenuity are qualities traditionally attributed to Odysseus. However, 
aside from the Trojan Horse, Philostratus confines all his εὕρεσις skill to dissimulation and 
                                                             
120 Rhet. 3.5 1407b7–8. 
121 Whitmarsh (2005) 44. 
122 Her. 23.11.5–6. 
123 Ibid. 33.3.1–2; Eur. IA 192–198 locates the invention at Aulis as a game to kill waiting time; Soph. fr. 479 Radt, 
and Gorg. Pal. 30 refer to backgammon as an intelligent game, while Alcid. Od. 27 considers it as a dangerous pursuit.  
124 Her. 33.3. 
125 Ibid. 33.25.6–8. 
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chicanery126, which might in turn be seen as reflecting the negative qualities of a sophist. A claim 
to ‘correct’ Homer may be implied here too. Book 9 of Odyssey tells the story of how Odysseus 
evaded Polyphemus, perhaps Odysseus’ invention par excellence, which Protesilaus discards most 
categorically as a Homeric lie127. When the hero’s escaping trick has succeeded, he comments with 
self-satisfaction: 
 
But I took thought how all might be the very best, if I might find some way (εὑροίμην) of escape 
from death for my comrades and for myself. And I wove all sorts of wiles (δόλους) and schemes 
(μῆτιν), as a man will in a matter of life and death. Ηοm.                                             Od. 9.420–3128 
 
Philostratus strips his Odysseus of such credit; his intelligence is always channeled to malignant 
purposes. Palamedes, on the other hand, engages in all types of εὕρεσις, which provide for the 
common good. When the farmer who used to give offerings to the hero´s tomb at Ilium is 
troubled with hailstorms, Palamedes appears as revenant and ties a strap around the vine to 
protect it. Then, the Phoenician comments:  Σοφός γε ὁ ἥρως, ἀμπελουργέ, καὶ ἀεί τι εὑρίσκων 
ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (The hero is wise, vinedresser, and as usual he invented something to 
benefit humankind) 129.  
It is crucial that this remark is made by the Phoenician given that he is a character of 
‘the here and now’ constructed as a foreigner or outsider of Hellenic culture. The stories of 
Protesilaus, which are to a great extent Philostratus’ literary εὑρέσεις, serve to initiate him into 
the real Hellenic world and the cult of its heroes. Palamedes embodies a great degree of ancient 
wisdom; his revenant draws on precisely this wisdom and utilizes it in order to solve today’s 
problems. In this respect, heuresis becomes the vehicle whereby ancient heroic wisdom is 
channeled into the world where our two speakers now live. If the hitherto uninitiated ‘foreigner’ 
manages to grasp this interface between present and past, then the importance and relevance of 
antique myths, heroic cult, and values – constructed intersubjectively – is made more manifest.  
 
 
 
                                                             
126 Ibid. 34.2.2–3. Even this invention is however indirectly downplayed when Sthenelus calls it ‘not a siegecraft but 
battle by theft’ (27.9). 
127 Ibid. 1.5.1–5, 25.15.5, and 35.8.2–4. 
128 Transl. Murray (1919). 
129 Her. 21.9.1-2. 
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II.II. Gorgias 
   
Εὕρεσις (inventio) is, as we already saw, also relevant to rhetorical theory. It is one of the chief 
canons of rhetoric. Ιn fact, Aristotle defines rhetoric primarily as invention, ‘discovering the best 
available means of persuasion’130.  The five canons of rhetoric or stages of developing a persuasive 
argument were first codified in classical Rome and were explored in more depth later on: invention, 
arrangement, style, memory, and delivery131. However, as Spranzi notes, this division is implicitly 
present already in Aristotle’s Topica. The philosopher notes: ‘He who is about to ask questions 
must, first of all, choose the τόπος (commonplace) from which he should make his attack’132.  
Gorgias’ Palamedes is probably the earliest text, which grapples with the question of 
inventing a timely argument. At the outset of his defense (section 4), the hero is facing an ἀπορία, 
which entails a series of questions: where to start his speech from (πόθεν ἄρξωμαι;), how to arrange 
his arguments (τί δὲ πρῶτον εἴπω;), and to where he should turn in his defense (ποῖ δὲ τῆς 
ἀπολογίας τράπωμαι;). Odysseus’ accusation has come as a surprise to him (διὰ δὲ τὴν ἔκπληξιν), 
which has unavoidably led him to loss for speech (ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη τῷ λόγῳ). Gorgias (through the 
mouthpiece of Palamedes) articulates up front the orator’s perplexity about what sort of arguments 
he should generate against a false accusation:  
 
[…] ἂν μή τι παρ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς παρούσης ἀνάγκης μάθω, διδασκάλων ἐπικινδυνοτέρων 
ἢ ποριμωτέρων τυχών. 
 
[…] if I do not learn from the truth itself and from the present constraint, through finding therein 
teachers who provide more risks than resources.                                      Gorg. Pal. 4.4-6 
 
According to McComiskey, the necessity of εὑρίσκειν recurs here in another form, that of 
μανθάνειν133. How Palamedes’ speech will match up to Odysseus’ is dictated by the speaker’s two 
instructors: ἀλήθεια (truth) and ἀνάγκη (current constraint); the orator will be combining facts 
(Palamedes did not actually commit treachery) and a set of artful strategies necessitated by the 
present occasion134 (Palamedes is tried for treachery) to exit ἀπορία and refute the charge.  
                                                             
130 Rhet. 1355b25–26; see also 1355b8–17 and 35–39 on the purpose of artificial proofs (ἔντεχνοι πίστεις). 
131 Rhet. Her. 1.3; cf. Cic. Inv. 1.9, De or. 1.142, 2.79, and Quint. IO 3.3. 
132 Top. 155b4–8; see also Spranzi’s (2011) 31. 
133 McComiskey (2002) 47. 
134 Ἀνάγκη here constitutes the rhetorical situation and is thus relevant to καιρός. 
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 The sophist’s concern with εὕρεσις is also implied by his choice of the main hero. As 
shown in chapter 2, Gorgias’ Palamedes can be seen as a rhetorical treatise specially focused on 
how to invent topical arguments. This very preoccupation with finding or inventing is justified 
within the narrative framework of Palamedes who is considered the inventor par excellence. In 
section 30, the hero’s mythic inventions and past-life benefactions become an organic part of 
inventio serving as proof of benign ethos; devotion to such and such intellectual pursuits would 
not allow for malicious activities like treason, a fact that testifies to his ἀρετή (virtue) and εὔνοια 
(goodwill)135. This set of inventions, to which the judicial audience must be alert, is subservient to 
the whole process of furnishing topical – in this part ethical – arguments from probability. If so, 
the invention-related process of μαθεῖν, exhibited as necessity in the very beginning of the speech 
and left pending ever since, is now reaching a climax with the hero’s own inventions. Gorgias 
paves the way to identifying one of the myth’s core elements (i.e. inventions) with solving current 
situational problems (i.e. inventio). 
  Conceivably, behind Palamedes’ strong formulations in these lines, one could identify a 
touch of sagacious self-confidence. Such assertive claims were kin to the itinerant intellectuals of 
the fifth and fourth centuries who would liken their humanistic activity to that of culture hero136. 
Counting on the fact that Gorgias produced his own art and would charge his students huge fees, 
it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that by μέγας εὐεργέτης ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ 
τῶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων (a great benefactor for you, both for the Greeks and for all humans)137 the 
sophist implicitly valorizes his own art; nor would it be untimely to proclaim that his inventional 
art (εὑρών) ἐποίησε τὸν ἀνθρώπειον βίον πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου (transformed human life from 
resourceless to resourceful)138. In this light, the concept of εὕρεσις evinces a degree of self-
referentiality.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
135 McComiskey (2002) 19–20. 
136 A good example is the myth of Prometheus in Protagoras; see also Lanza (2012) 12 n. 43. 
137 Pal. 30. 
138 Ibid. 
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III. Intellectual φθόνος 
 
III.I. Admirer of wickedness (Her. 34.1.2–3) 
  
Unjust murder or unjust conviction is integral to the myth of Palamedes arguably since its 
inception139. Archaic and Classical accounts that reproduce the Trojan tale connect three names to 
the fatal end of the hero: Odysseus140, Diomedes141 and/or Agamemnon142. In Cypria, the oldest 
account at our disposal, we learn that Palamedes unmasked Odysseus’ faked madness143 causing 
the latter to grow anger and plot together with Diomedes Palamedes’ murder144. There is no actual 
reference to any precedent feud or any sentiment whatsoever. It is implied, however, that 
Palamedes proved himself smarter when he risked the life of Telemachus in order to elicit the 
desired response from Odysseus and thereby expose his lies.  
 The theme of φθόνος is introduced in the myth in late fifth-century tragedy and rhetoric145. 
We know that Euripides’ Palamedes was staged in 415 BCE (along with Alexander and Trojan 
Women) but we do not know for sure whether Gorgias’ speech predated it146. In the latter work, 
φθόνος, κακοτεχνία (subterfuge) and πανουργία (wickedness) emerge as the probable motivations 
behind Odysseus’ accusation147. For authors and mythographers to come, Roman and Greek, the 
tragic fate of Palamedes and Odysseus’ envy will go hand in hand and will occasion multiple fertile 
contexts for political allusion and philosophical rumination148.  
 About seven centuries later, Philostratus will treat this subject in much more depth in 
Heroicus. The serial clashes with Odysseus in section 33 show that the hero is given due 
                                                             
139 For a detailed analysis of the murder of Palamedes and its treatment in various accounts see Lyra (1987) 145–192 
and specifically 155–192 on the mythic accounts regarding the hero’s execution. 
140 In older accounts, Odysseus is in full charge of the plot; Lyra (1987) 157. 
141 As Odysseus’ partner in crime, most prominently in Cypria, Dictys 2.15, and the scholion to Eur. Or. 432.  
142Agamemnon is mostly presented as being persuaded by Odysseus and Diomedes’ planted evidence (Apollod. Epit. 
3,8, Hyginus fab. 105, Servius sch. to Aen. 2.81); in some accounts he consciously implicates himself in Palamedes’ 
prosecution (sch. to Eur. Or. 432, Philostr. Her. 33.27, Dio Chr. Or. 13,21, and Libanius ep. 791.3). 
143 Procl. Chrest. 80.30-33. 
144 Cypria fr. 30 Bernabé (= Paus. 10.31.2); see also Lyra (1987) 153–4. 
145 The word φθόνος or its cognates does not appear in the extant fragments of the Palamedes; yet, judging from fr. 
588 Kannicht, where the chorus blames the Achaeans collectively for killing the wisest man (πάνσοφον), and from fr. 
580, where most probably Odysseus addresses Agamemnon and states that even the σοφώτατοι are susceptible to 
bribery, we can assume that φθόνος was a central theme in the play.  
146 For suggested dates see Liarou (2009) 109.  
147 Pal. 3.6–7 (cf. 32.4 where Palamedes portrays himself as μὴ φθονερός). 
148 The ill-fated and maligned Palamedes becomes somewhat proverbial from fourth century onwards; see e.g. Xen. 
Mem. 4.2.33. and Ap. 26. 
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prominence if and only if he is seen in contrast to the antagonist or as anti-Odysseus149. Such 
clashes may mirror a degree of oppositionality between authors, genres, and traditions (i.e. 
Philostratus versus Homer, sophistry/sophia versus epic etc.).  Envy is not just announced here; 
rather, its causes are unfolding gradually and, when necessary, the narrator intervenes and 
comments (see synopsis). The use of direct speech, the debating setting framed by a responding 
public of Achaeans, and the use of the imperfect (ἐπετείχιζεν, ξυνετίθει)150 showing Odysseus’ 
persistent envy, are some indications of the author’s zeal to animate this conflictual relationship 
and underscore the tragic dimensions of the unjust prosecution. Tragic irony reaches its peak when 
the hero agrees to follow Agamemnon’s plan and tension is resolved with the lyric verses from 
Euripides’ Palamedes151. 
 In order to create the narrative space needed for such purposes, Philostratus has the 
vinedresser initially refuse to follow the version we find in Cypria about Odysseus’ madness152. 
Instead, for him Odysseus came to Aulis very eagerly, and he had already been famous for his 
cleverness by time of enlistment153. In locating the antagonist hero in Aulis of his own free will 
Philostratus restores Odysseus to his heroic ethos and starts the envy tale with the two heroes 
battling on equal terms.  
  After seven Teubner pages saturated in φθόνος, Palamedes is stoned to death. If there is 
any space to discuss Odysseus, this should be right here, so long as we, readers, are nurturing the 
most negative emotions. Yet, a good deal of his portrait is confined to his role as the protagonist’s 
foil: 
 
Protesilaus describes Odysseus as follows: he was extremely skilled in speaking (ῥητορικώτατον) and 
clever (δεινόν), a dissimulator (εἴρωνα), lover of envy (ἐραστὴν φθόνου), and an admirer of wickedness 
(τὸ κακόηθες ἐπαινοῦντα).                                                                                 Her. 34.1.1–4  
   
                                                             
149 Philostratus seems to be following almost the same path in his rendering of Odysseus and Ajax’s relationship. The 
latter, who is close friend of Palamedes, is also a master of ἀρετή, yet this time expressed in terms of courage and 
warlike spirit (Her. 35.7–8). Odysseus does not manage to surpass his virtue, he feels φθόνος (Her. 20.3), concedes 
to the unjust decision of the Trojans (35.11.3–5) to pass Achilles’ panoply to him, and then Ajax is maddened to death. 
Protesilaus disproves Homer’s story that Ajax was outwrestled by Odysseus (35.8.3–5). The vinedresser links 
Odysseus directly to Ajax’s death (καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ ἀπεύξασθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ νίκην ἐλέῳ τοιοῦδε ἀνδρὸς ἐπ’ αὐτῇ 
ἀποθανόντος <sc. Αἴαντος>; 35.10.8–9). For the reception of Odysseus in Dictys, Philostratus, and Dares of Phrygium 
see Stanford (1968) 146–158. 
150 Her. 33.13.2 and 33.24.1. 
151 Ibid. 34.7. 
152 Ibid. 33.4. 
153 Ibid. 33.4.5–6.  
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This is how the section of Odysseus starts and its end is equally gloomy. In comparison with all 
other heroes of the text, his character is seen in singularly negative light. Such is the singularity in 
the attribution ἐραστὴν φθόνου. In the extant Greek, φθονεῖν and ἐρᾶν are combined together only 
in two possible ways regarding syntax: a) if X is jealous of their lover (φθονεῖν ἐραστήν)154 or b) 
if a lover appears as φθονερός155. To my knowledge, this is the only incidence in which ἐραστής 
is construed with φθόνου as objective genitive, the exact counter-model of Palamedes as ἐραστὴς 
σοφίας.   
 
 
III.II. Chaerephon’s joke (VS 483) 
 
While gathering and assessing Philostratus’ material about Gorgias in chapter 1, we postponed the 
discussion about a joke made by a certain Chaerephon. In VS 483, Philostratus says that Gorgias 
did not escape people’s envy and illustrates this with a joke156. Even though Philostratus 
distinguishes the Chaerephon of this story from the one called ‘box-wood’ in comedy, it appears 
that he is probably talking about the same person, who also happens to be in conflict with Polus 
(and by extension with Gorgias) in Plato’s Gorgias157. The sources profile him as a character who 
fancies intellectual discussion and moves easily in the social circles of the day, but without any 
phenomenal IQ. In an attempt to ridicule Gorgias’ ambitions, he asks him: ‘Why is it that beans 
inflate my stomach, but do not inflate the fire?’. As Wright notes158, the play is on the verb φυσῶ, 
which means both ‘to blow out the bellows’ and ‘to inflate’. Gorgias responds: ‘I leave this for 
you to answer, but I know that the earth grows canes (φύει νάρθηκας) for such as you’. This 
manifestation is comparable to the case of Odysseus’ φθόνος against Palamedes that we saw 
earlier; Chaerephon’s attitude is framed in terms of insolence (ὕβριν ἤσκει) as he is a resentful 
competitor for sophistic distinction (τὴν σπουδὴν Γοργίου διαμασώμενος). 
                                                             
154 As in Pl., Phdr. 240a4, Lucian, Dialogi marini 1.5.3, and Philostr. Ep. 1.57.10. 
155 As in Bessarion, In calumniatorem Platonis 4.2.4.43. 
156 Φθόνος and its cognates appear six times in Lives; of these, only two are instances of intellectual φθόνος, the one 
referring to Gorgias, and the other to Polemo.  
157 Pl. Grg. 447c-449a. Chaerephon was a close friend to Socrates so Philostratus’ sources could well have been the 
following: Pl. Ap. 20e–21a, Chrm. 153b, Xen. Mem. 2.3.15, Athen.4.134–136.  
158 (1921) 11. 
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 The use of double entendre in Chaerephon’s joke is significant; stomach (γαστήρ) is 
mapped onto material appetite, and fire (πῦρ) onto intelligence. But what does the reference to 
canes (νάρθηκες) exactly mean in Gorgias’ reply? Is it just a hit-back or does it convey more?  
 Partially Gorgias continues the joke. However, Philostratus seems to like ambiguity. Many 
times one sentence or word may allow for multiple meanings. In Hesiod159, Prometheus uses a 
νάρθηξ (giant fennel160) as a stalk to pass the sacral fire to humanity. Like Palamedes, Prometheus 
is routinely referred to as culture hero, and interestingly, his and Palamedes’ inventions are 
intermeshed in some sources161. The instrument Prometheus uses to spread civilization across 
humanity and the instrument Gorgias threatens to use to ‘civilize’ Chaerephon’s attitude are 
identical. The overtones assigned to these two νάρθηκες are similar too: Prometheus’ fennel will 
burn with the fire (i.e. an intelligent invention) that will change the world, while Gorgias’ νάρθηξ 
will burn with the fire, which ‘inflated’ Chaerephon’s envy. Going a little further, Xenophon says 
that the pedagogues or ναρθηκοφόροι (cudgel-bearers) often used such fennels to school their 
disciples162. Philostratus, too, makes mention of such rods for chastisement elsewhere163. Finally, 
the divine fire was brought to humankind as a form of wisdom, knowledge, and civilization. The 
sophistic movement can be seen in a similar light and framed as an intellectual progression upon 
humanity. Earlier we saw that one might identify some degree of sophistic self-referentiality on 
the part of Gorgias in Palamedes’ enumerating his inventions. Similarly, the myth of Prometheus 
in Plato’s Protagoras has favored analogous interpretations164.  
 Let us now put this information together to see how φθόνος contextualizes rhetorical 
discourse. The elements residing in Chaerephon’s joke (beans, fire etc.), which show his envy, 
trigger Gorgias’ νάρθηξ-response. On the surface level, the reader perceives the sophist’s response 
as a threat to beat Chaerephon. On a second glance, the use of νάρθηξ triggers a wider nexus of 
meanings, which depart from joke-area: the πῦρ is mapped onto the giant fennel, which carried the 
sacral fire, and is thus re-contextualized within the activity of Hesiod’s culture-hero, Prometheus. 
Beating Chaerephon with a cane may as well serve to correctionalize his behavior and instruct him 
in some kind of way; in this respect, νάρθηξ stimulates the mind to think of the cudgel-bearers and 
their pedagogical techniques mentioned in Cyropaedia.  
                                                             
159 Hes. Theog. 566–7. 
160 Thphr. HP 1.2.7, Dsc. 3.77. 
161 Gera (2003) 122-3 and specifically n.41 on Aesch. Palamedes fr.182a Radt, transmitted as a scholion to PV 459.  
162 Xen. Cyr. 2.3.20. 
163 Philostr. VA 8.3. 
164 Denyer (2008) ad loc.  
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 If we reflect for a moment on the vignettes, envy against both Gorgias and Palamedes 
arises in similar contexts165. Chaerephon maligned Gorgias because he practiced extempore 
rhetoric and as a speaker he seized the opportune moment (ἐπαφῆκεν ἑαυτὸν τῷ καιρῷ). 
Palamedes is also depicted to give speeches in front of the ἐκκλησίαι of the Achaeans. Kairotic 
argumentation is traced in Her. 33 too. The heroes’ debate seems to follow a certain pattern, 
which consists in the inability of one to deliver a timely judgment and the natural disposition of 
the other to rectify him. Palamedes knows what is most appropriate in a given situation166. An 
external stimulus (i.e. the Moon/some cranes/wolves) operates in a certain way (i.e. block of the 
Sun’s disk/customary flying formation/menacing attacks), which triggers Odysseus to make an 
inapposite judgment (i.e. man must not speak of heavenly matters/the cranes found the 
letters/wolves should be exterminated right away). Then Palamedes exhibits why these 
propositions are wrong (i.e. man first becomes wise about the earth and then about the 
heavens/the Muses needed a wise man to discover the letters through the cranes) or unfavorable 
(i.e. wolves express Apollo´s will and to exterminate them will not avert the plague).  
 Odysseus’ φθόνος increases when he is outsmarted and ridiculed by a younger man in 
front of the Achaeans (community). He worries about his image and conceives the foul plot as 
soon he senses his social status is at stake167. There are some indications implying the 
transformation of the Achaean camp into a court: the use of the term μαρτύρονται, at 33.10.4, 
reads as if Odysseus addresses the Achaeans as though the jury to testify on his behalf regarding 
the invention of the alphabet. Palamedes’ condemnatory tone (σὺ δ’ οὐδὲν ἂν περὶ τάξεως 
εἴποις)168 fits in a litigation setting. Additionally, Odysseus is implicitly portrayed as a malicious 
plaintiff, who uses his (rhetorical) inventio unjustly (ἄδικον εὑρὼν κρίσιν, εὕρηται δέ μοι κατ’ 
αυτοῦ τέχνη; see II.I.). Last but not least, the reader is given occasional hints as to how the 
surrounding audience receive the hero’s advice and interact with his performances. They are 
invited to opt for one λόγος over the other (antilogical mode); Palamedes’ persuasiveness is such 
that they end up thinking every word of his like an oracle from god169. Λόγος here is as forceful 
                                                             
165 Cf. Heracleides’ delivery in the court of Emperor Severus and Philostratus’ attendant remarks on envy in public 
contexts (VS 614.2–11). Here too, φθόνος is an anticipated feature in extempore speeches; in a way, it betokens the 
intellectual growth and status of a good speaker. 
166 For Palamedes as instructor also in juxtaposition with Her. 33.21 see Mariscal (2008) 148–149.  
167 Her. 33.13.1–2; the distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδος are key elements also in Gorgias’ 
Palamedes. The imaginary jury is invited by the speaker to consider Odysseus’ accusation in terms of opinion as 
opposed to truth and actual knowledge (Pal. 3, 22, 24, 35.5,); cf. Hel. 9.1, 10.2–5, 11.7–9, 13.3–9, and 21.3. 
168 Her. 33.11. 
169 Ibid. 33.15.4–5. 
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as in Hel. 8 (λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν): καὶ γὰρ ἥττηντο <οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ> τῶν τοῦ Παλαμήδους 
λόγων170; it was the words of Palamedes, which made the Achaeans surrender or be enslaved 
(ἡσσάομαι + gen. rei)171, and which incited them to action, just as Paris’ word enslaved Helen 
(see following section).  
 Finally, φθόνος is constructed as ‘anticipated’ by the speaker in both Palamedes172 and 
Heroicus. At Pal. 28, the hero feels the need to ask the jury not to feel envy at what he will say 
(μηδένα φθονῆσαι τοῖς λεγομένοις) a strategy aiming to pre-empt the emergence of φθόνος or 
minimize its vigor. Such an appeal shows that Palamedes is aware that to mention his inventions 
and benefactions may come across as invidious (περὶ ἐμοῦ βούλομαι εἰπεῖν ἐπίφθονον μὲν 
ἀληθὲς δέ). As we saw earlier, his defense is the product of what truth and compulsion will 
instruct him to say (Pal. 4). He mentions ahead that he only wishes to speak the truth in reply to 
terrible lies (δεινὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καί τι τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰπεῖν) and not out of complacency. At 
Her. 33.9, too, after Odysseus’ departure, Palamedes is becoming conscious of his opponent’s 
envy and prepares himself for future malignances (παρασκευάζων πρὸς βασκαίνοντα).     
 
 
IV. Recovering Gorgias through Plato: the medicine–rhetoric exemplum 
 
Contrary to εὕρεσις and φθόνος, themes already inherent in the myth of Palamedes and thereafter 
reconsidered in rhetorical context by Gorgias, I now wish to focus attention on an element, which, 
I submit, was Philostratus’ innovation. In the episode with the wolves (third vignette), Palamedes 
asserts the omnipotence of sophia and acknowledges that every other techne or episteme is 
subservient. As example he uses medicine, which earlier in the text Chiron offered to teach to him, 
and Palamedes rejected. This example is borrowed from Plato’s Gorgias. So far I have been using 
intertextuality to address similarities between Heroicus and Gorgias’ fragments. In no extant 
fragment, however, can we trace any claim about medicine being subordinate to rhetoric. It is 
possible that such an idea was never enunciated by Gorgias himself or that we simply lack the 
primary material to substantiate such a hypothesis. It is thus necessary to expand our intertextuality 
                                                             
170 Ibid. 33.7. 
171 LSJ s.v. ἡσσάομαι (4). 
172 Cf. Gorgias’ Funerary oration (DK B 6.11–13), where the speaker communicates his fear that his lavish praise of 
the fallen warriors might chance an invidious reaction in the audience. However, here φθόνος would be aroused not 
against the individual but against other agents of the community. 
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boundaries and consider not only Gorgias’ texts, but also texts about Gorgias. Plato often mentions 
Gorgias in his dialogues, primarily in those concerned with rhetoric and virtue. It is not my 
intention here to decide whether or not Platonic adaptations do injustice to Gorgias’ doctrine, 
which they do to a great extent173. My actual intention is to see how Philostratus appropriates a 
literary exemplum, which Plato attributes to Gorgias in the eponymous dialogue, in order to 
describe the functions of ‘Palamedean sophia’.   
 Already in the first vignette, our hero indirectly claims to know much about the earth and 
to speak wisely about the heavens (λέγειν σοφόν τι περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων)174. The opposite goes for 
Odysseus whose understanding of τάξις (arrangement) is found fault with a few lines later175. In 
both astronomy and divination, the antagonist proposes a mythic figure to hold authoritative 
power. His argument is that if Zeus is the master of heavens (field of astronomy) and if Calchas is 
expert in the task of prophecy, Palamedes has no right to speak of any of these. Despite Odysseus’ 
proposed limitations to human knowledge, Palamedes scores valid points in both divination and 
astronomy. 
But what are the limits to our hero’s sophia? Things are getting clearer in the third vignette, 
when Palamedes tries to persuade the Greeks that the menacing wolves are sent by Apollo to signal 
the upcoming plague. The proactive plan he is suggesting involves a series of changes in diet and 
physical condition: 
 
But we, men of Greece, let us take care of ourselves, and if we want to keep away disease we must 
have a light diet and vigorous movement. For even though I have not studied medicine, anything can 
be grasped by wisdom (ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἡψάμην, σοφίᾳ δὲ καταληπτὰ ἅπαντα).  
                                                                                         Her. 33.14.13–17  
 
According to this excerpt, an individual does not need to master a specific techne as long as he is 
endowed with sophia. His wisdom suffices to make him efficient in various scenarios, which 
pertain to a specific area of expertise. In this illustration, the idea that numerous technai are 
subservient to the property of sophia is materialized by reference to medicine. Going beyond 
divination and astronomy, wisdom qualifies the hero to speak as a doctor. Similarly, the knowledge 
he exhibited formerly when he obscured the authority of Calchas and Zeus, now eclipses figures 
                                                             
173 Consigny (2001) 35–37, 151, 165–169. 
174 Her. 33.8.1–4. 
175 Ibid. 33. 11.7–9. 
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such as Chiron and Machaon176, who were well-known in the Trojan tale for their medical 
expertise.  
 A little while ago, Philostratus stressed twice that Palamedes did not actually ever study to 
become a physician: 
 
βουλομένου δὲ τοῦ Χείρωνος ἰατρικὴν διδάσκειν αὐτόν, “ἐγὼ” ἔφη, “ὦ Χείρων, ἰατρικὴν μὲν ἡδέως 
οὐκ οὖσαν ἂν εὗρον, εὑρημένην δὲ οὐκ ἀξιῶ μανθάνειν [...] 
 
When Chiron wanted to teach him medicine, he said, “I would gladly have discovered it if it had not 
yet existed, but since it is already discovered, I do not think I want to learn it [...]                    Her. 33.2 
 
Even so, he is perfectly capable of speaking wisely of medical issues, hence the efficacy of his 
plan. The utilization of specifically the art of medicine as subordinate to the property of ‘speaking 
wisely’ calls to mind Gorgias’ description of the power of rhetoric in Gorgias. 
 When Socrates goads Gorgias into defending and praising the power of rhetoric, the sophist 
first establishes that rhetoric has subsumed and taken control of all other powers or fields of 
specialist knowledge: 
 
GORG. Ah yes, if you knew all, Socrates,—how it comprises in itself practically all powers at once! 
And I will tell you a striking proof of this: many and many a time have I gone with my brother or other 
doctors to visit one of their patients, and found him unwilling either to take medicine or submit to the 
surgeon’s knife or cautery; and when the doctor failed to persuade him I succeeded, by no other art 
than that of rhetoric (οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ). 
And I further declare that, if a rhetorician and a doctor were to enter any city you please, and there had 
to contend in speech before the Assembly or some other meeting as to which of the two should be 
appointed physician, you would find the physician was nowhere, while the master of speech would be 
appointed if he wished (ἀλλ᾿ αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο).            Pl. Grg. 456b–c177  
 
On all these occasions, says Gorgias, the doctor has failed to make his patient follow the proposed 
treatment because of his lack of persuasive speech178. In this respect, the ῥήτωρ is privileged over 
the ἰατρός, because he can catalyze treatment implementation. The significance of science, its 
methods, tools, and practices are not at all downplayed. What Gorgias questions, instead, is the 
ability of a doctor to communicate the necessity of his discipline. This is the part where Gorgias 
                                                             
176 Machaon is not mentioned by Philostratus. However, given the dense nexus of allusions to Homeric epic and 
especially to Iliad, it is impossible to imagine that the author and his reader were not aware of the hero’s medical 
powers.    
177 Transl. Lamb (1925). 
178 Plato (Leg. 720d, 857c–d) opposes the idea that a good doctor should use rhetoric to overcome a patient’s refusal 
to medical treatment; for sources on patients resisting treatment in medical texts see Dodds (1959) 210 ad τεμεῖν ἢ 
καῦσαι.  
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emphasizes the uniqueness of his profession with an emphatic active ἐγὼ ἔπεισα179.  Ultimately, 
for Gorgias among the competing discourses (διαγωνίζεσθαι) rhetoric emerges as dominant180.  
There is evidence that Gorgias himself was associated with doctors and medicine. 
According to the passage above, his brother, Herodicus, was a doctor181  and through him or other 
doctors, Gorgias met with many patients. In the life of Empedocles, Diogenes Laertius citing from 
Satyrus, says that Gorgias, who was a student of Empedocles (Γοργίαν οὖν τὸν Λεοντῖνον αὐτοῦ 
γενέσθαι μαθητήν), claimed to have been present when Empedocles would perform magical feats 
(ὡς αὐτὸς παρείη τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι)182. Empedocles was a doctor and wrote many 
medical books183. It is important that Satyrus here refers to him as ἰατρός καὶ ῥήτωρ. If Gorgias’ 
education was moulded on the basis of these two models, from which he rejected medicine and 
developed or, according to others, even initiated the art of language, we may suspect why 
Philostratus’ Palamedes also rejects medicine in favor of a type of paideia that would afford him 
maximal comprehension (σοφίᾳ δὲ καταληπτὰ ἅπαντα).  
There may be no text by Gorgias posing the subordination of medicine to the all-
encompassing rhetoric, but there is a passage where the two are correlated. In Hel. 14, Gorgias 
likens the way, in which different kinds of drugs have ambiguous effects on the body, to the way, 
in which different kinds of λόγοι have ambiguous effects on the soul184. The analogy between the 
functions of logos and those of medicine raises the use of rhetoric to a matter of life and death. 
The sophist concludes his investigation about the possible outcomes of different logoi with an 
interesting addition: οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν (others 
drugged and bewitched the soul by some evil persuasion)185. This ‘super-naturalist’ worldview, as 
                                                             
179 See also Olympiodorus’ critique (In Platonis Gorgiam commentaria 6.11.8–21), who finds Gorgias’ claim to be 
more efficient than his brother annoying and obfuscating. 
180 The idea recurs in Pl. Phlb. 58b–c, when Protarchus is invited to respond to Socrates’ claim that the knowledge 
relating to being, reality, and eternal immutability is the truest kind of knowledge (ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν). The 
man recalls Gorgias’ conviction that the art of persuasion surpasses all other τέχναι (ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι 
πασῶν τεχνῶν) and makes them subject to itself by free will (ὑφ᾿ αὑτῇ δοῦλα δι᾿ ἑκόντων…ποιοῖτο). Keeping up with 
Plato’s language, the trained orator is, then, an artful slave-master who influences decision making by means of 
persuasion. 
181 cf. Suida Γοργίας. 
182 Diog. Laert. 8. 58–59. 
183 Suida Ἐμπεδοκλῆς l.16. 
184 See Dodds (1959) ad 456b6. A similar comparison is made in Isoc. 8.39, which the orator might have borrowed 
from his teacher Gorgias. In Pl. Tht. 167a5–6 we read: So, in education, too, a change has to be made from a worse to 
a better condition; but the doctor brings about the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of 
words; translation is mine); the example medicine – rhetoric here switches to medicine – sophistry and the comparison 
is now made between a doctor’s medical methods and a sophist’s pedagogical activities. 
185 Hel. 14. 
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Segal puts it186, relating to magic and trickery is reminiscent of two other aspects of logos in 
Gorgias: first, persuasion as mental enslavement, which we saw earlier, and second, persuasion as 
deception or ἀπάτη187. Rhetoric apparently triggers some sort of psychological coercion or 
compulsion. In the latter passage, it is made explicit that it can be used for either good or bad ends 
(πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ), hence its moral neutrality. Helen is deeply concerned with the dynamis and 
nature of logos (cf. λόγος δυνάστης μέγας at 8). For some scholars the speech should rather be 
read as an encomium of logos. Segal suggests it ‘may even have served as a kind of formal 
profession of the aims and the methods of his (i.e. Gorgias’) art’188.  
 In sum, Philostratus harnesses the rhetoric–medicine exemplum to establish the 
omnipotence of sophia. A wise hero, as we saw, needs to speak wisely about any subject, a claim 
implied by Palamedes in his first encounter with Odysseus189. In Lives, we also saw that a sophist 
needs by definition to be an eloquent virtuoso. Palamedes’ wisdom depends on his ability to invent 
and provide for the good of the community. Just as in the Gorgianic perception of rhetoric, intellect 
(not sophia) for Philostratus may be used for evil ends too, an idea exemplified by Odysseus, 
probably an example of sophist to avoid. Although the author is very careful with the terms he 
uses to describe Odysseus’ intellectuality – all uncomplimentary190 – (μηχανήματα191, δεινόν, 
ῥητορικώτατον192 etc.), he includes just once the possibility that sophia may indeed be ambivalent 
in terms of ethics: ἀλλ’ ἔφθησαν αὐτὸν αἱ Ὀδυσσέως μηχαναὶ σοφῶς ξυντεθεῖσαι, καὶ χρυσοῦ μὲν 
ἥττων ἔδοξε <Παλαμήδης> προδότης τε εἶναι κατεψεύσθη (But the machinery of Odysseus’ plots, 
which had been ingeniously constructed, overtook him, and Palamedes was framed for accepting 
bribes and falsely accused of treason)193. Even so, Odysseus is never called σοφός; even here, the 
phrase σοφῶς ξυντεθεῖσαι qualifies μηχαναί, a term often used to describe duplicity or trickery, 
and for this reason its combination with σοφῶς sounds a little oxymoronic compared to how 
Protesilaus or Palamedes’ sophia is presented194. In any case, the myth of Palamedes and 
Odysseus, as said, was traditionally offered for reflection on the nature of sophia, and I hope to 
have satisfactorily shown that, in plugging himself in this tradition, Philostratus in his Heroicus 
                                                             
186 Segal (1962) 112. 
187 Futter (2011) 7. 
188 Segal (1962) 102. 
189 Her. 33.8. 
190 Miles (2017)a 91. 
191 Ibid. 33.30. 
192 Ibid. 34.1. 
193 Ibid. 33.1. 
194 On the ambivalence of soph- terms in Heroicus see Favreau Linder (2015) 38.  
46 
 
relied a great deal on Gorgias. What remains now is to investigate how our sophist’s dependence 
on Gorgias imports in Heroicus’ literary, intellectual, and cultural world. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Discussion 
 
In this chapter, I wish to discuss how ‘Gorgianizing’ contributes to the rhetorical and sophistic 
world of Heroicus as well as in what ways it enriches our understanding of Philostratus’ 
intellectual agenda.  
Gorgias was indeed a key figure in the transition from archaic poetry to Attic prose and 
from the late Archaic myth-based poetry to the Classical logos-driven prosaic philosophy. As 
cultural father of a series of intellectuals (see also letter 73) Gorgias sets the record straight as to 
what the prototypical sophist looks like or, put more accurately, he is the ultimate ancient source, 
in which Philostratus anchors his (re)conceptualization of sophist195. In this discussion, three 
different yet closely interrelated processes can be traced in order to assess what emulation of 
Gorgias imports in Philostratus’ self-presentation: i) grounding (what common ground does 
Philostratus establish between Second Sophistic intellectuals (including himself) and their literary 
father?), reconstitution (how does Philostratus redefine the image of a sophist via Gorgias?), and 
innovation (how does Philostratus articulate independently his paradigmatic notion of sophia in 
Heroicus?).  
 
 
I. Grounding 
 
1. Father of extemporization (VS 482). The prominence that Philostratus gives to improvisational 
rhetoric in Lives is in line with the performative nature public speaking started to have especially 
from the first century CE onwards196. Speakers of the Imperial Era would perform their speeches 
in public on a plethora of subjects. In Lives, Gorgias is considered as father of extempore speeches; 
in a way, systematic improvisation, came along with the birth of rhetoric in the theatre of Dionysus. 
The emphatic ‘προβάλλετε’ illustrates the sophist’s innate preparedness to answer whatever 
question his audience would pose197. Genuine extemporization is a must quality for all sophists 
                                                             
195 Anderson (1986) 40 n.94 notes: ‘To some extent Philostratus may misrepresent the activities even of Gorgias, in 
order to suit his own conception of a sophist’; cf. p. 35. 
196 Contrary for example to Hellenistic times; Whitmarsh (2005) 16.  
197 VS 482; cf. Pl. Grg. 447c, Men. 70b–c, and Cic. Inv. 1.7. 
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whom Philostratus in Lives regards as outstanding virtuosi198. Epideictic oratory would take the 
form of declamations (μελέται), formal talks (διαλέξεις), or tasters (προλαλιαί)199, in which all 
sophists would fashion publicly oriented personae promoting certain beliefs, which held 
authoritative truths. In declamations, sophists in the audience were often asked for a theme or 
opinion200.  
Father of extempore speech entails father of kairos argumentation201. At VS 483, Gorgias 
ridicules Prodicus for recounting the same clichéd fable about the dilemma of Achilles in every 
Greek city and not opting for the opportune moment. In chapter 3, we saw how the argument of 
kairos informs a great deal of the debates between Odysseus and Palamedes too.  
 2. Inventio/heuresis. Philostratus uses Gorgias’ rhetorical heuresis as a foil for his own 
literary inventions. Alcidamas, who perhaps was Gorgias’ student, also used the myth of 
Palamedes presumably to respond to Gorgias’ earlier defense202. But Philostratus was the only 
sophist to avail himself of Palamedes’ mythic inventions so as to reflect on the meta-textual uses 
of inventio in Heroicus.  
3. Courtier of the Severans. Gorgias paid his first (?) visit to Athens as ambassador to seek 
help for his hometown. In Lives, Philostratus emphasizes Gorgias’ great political speech at 
Olympia203 where by acting as the advocate of reconciliation (ὁμονοίας ξύμβουλος) he tried to 
reconcile the Greeks against the barbarians ‘His Olympian Oration dealt with a theme of the 
highest importance to the state’. His funeral speech in Athens was also about a civic matter, namely 
to commend the Athenian warriors who fell in the wars and whom the state buried in public 
expenditure. In the same speech, which was composed with extraordinary cleverness (σοφίᾳ δὲ 
ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ξύγκειται)204, he once again tried to unite the Greeks against the barbarians. From 
its inception with Gorgias, epideictic rhetoric was imbued with political and practical significance 
and was connected to Pan-Hellenic institutions. Gorgias was on good terms with authority figures 
like Jason of Pherae, tyrant of Thessaly, who must have been his patron205. Philostratus, too, was 
a sophist who, between 203 and 208 CE, was introduced to the Imperial family, became a member 
                                                             
198 Anderson (1986) 32 (cf. 27–8, 47). 
199 Bowie (2009) 25.  
200 VS 572. 
201 Cf. Dion. Hal. Comp. verb. 12.68, who says that Gorgias was the first to write about kairos. 
202 Alcidamas wrote a speech entitled Odysseus against the treachery of Palamedes and defending Odysseus.  
203 VS 493: His Olympian Oration dealt with a theme of the highest importance to the state. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Consigny (2001) 221 n.9. 
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of Julia’s circle, and accompanied Emperor Caracalla in some of his journeys206. The biography 
of Apollonius of Tyana was commissioned to him personally by the empress. In Lives, the author 
frequently refers to his sophists as diplomats, members of embassies, and imperial secretaries207. 
The most prominent speeches are speeches delivered also in Olympia, Delphi, and Isthmus. Recent 
research on Heroicus has suggested that the text promotes Alexander Severus’ strategic policy 
towards the rising empire of Sassanians208. A sophist’s advisory activity as well as his advocacy 
to political or ethnic matters is also an element Philostratus links with Gorgias. 
4. Antagonistic community. The anecdotal story of Chaerephon’s witticisms against 
Gorgias is a clear illustration of how a sophist’s successful career in public speaking often 
occasioned envy and quarrels, as well as an indication of the demands of performing. Gorgias, too, 
censures Prodicus for his hackneyed subjects. In Philostratus’ day, public performers often relied 
on making enemies in their various audiences – on and off stage – in order to establish and further 
their reputation amongst their pedantic rivals209. Quarrels amongst professionals is one of the main 
elements that influenced Philostratus’ selection of material in Lives.   
 
 
II. Reconstitution 
 
Aside from establishing common ground between the ancient and Second Sophistic, 
Philostratus used Gorgias to redefine sophistic values and restore the image of sophist reaffirming 
his own positionality. As we saw, the second cluster of intellectuals in Lives, enumerates eight 
sophists who treated their topics philosophically. Gorgias was the first of this group and since he 
was the father of sophistry, then we infer that from its inception sophistry was philosophically-
oriented. The opposite goes for the third group of sophists, in which Philostratus belonged himself. 
This group, starting with Aeschines, abandoned philosophical abstraction, grappled with more 
practical issues and in a more systematic way. Consequently, despite Lives’ conviction that the 
intellectuals of the ‘Next’ or ‘Second Sophistic’ were the continuators of a long-lasting tradition, 
there is an implied discontinuity between these two moves. That explains why certain intellectuals 
                                                             
206 Bowie (2009) 20. 
207 Anderson (1993) 31. 
208 Shayegan (2004) 285–315.  
209 Anderson (1986) 43–5. 
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from this period who practiced philosophy, such as Dio of Prusa, are not considered as genuine 
sophists and are treated parenthetically. 
Heroicus is, at first glance, at variance with these theoretical divisions in Lives. Both the 
vinedresser (following the advice of Protesilaus) and Palamedes, the two prime pepaideumenoi of 
the text, engage in sophistic activities while at the same time embracing a philosophical way of 
life210. The vinedresser changed clothes211 when he met Protesilaus and started to philosophize 
along with the hero212. Protesilaus shares his prophetic wisdom, interprets Homer’s poems most 
accurately213, and cures a number of diseases214. Palamedes’ sophia is clearly constructed on a 
merging between the symbolic roles of both philosopher and sophist. His appearance was more of 
a philosopher’s, hirsute and slovenly;215 he was growing a light beard, while his face was earnest 
and kindly216, but also with a great deal of dirt (αὐχμὸν περὶ τῷ προσώπῳ ἔχειν πολὺν)217; his life 
was self-sufficient, austere, and ascetic, without any furnishings (αὐτουργὸς βίος καὶ ἔξω τοῦ 
κατεσκευάσθαι)218; he was apt in divination219 and in deciphering the signs of gods220. His dietary 
plan based on vegetarianism and intensive workout recalls the Pythagoreans221; overall, he 
embraces a set of moral values suggestive of a philosophical way of life (e.g. contempt for money, 
indifference to rewards etc.). Other elements emphasize the hero’s sophistic outlook222: he explains 
scientifically a natural phenomenon, that is, a solar eclipse, and possesses knowledge of 
astronomy, for which he is censured by Odysseus (first vignette). Palamedes’ assertion that 
everything can be learned by wisdom, as we saw, calls up the medicine versus rhetoric example in 
Pl. Gorgias, while his response to Chiron adds ‘a touch sophistic arrogance’223. In addition, when 
the hero instructs the Achaeans to follow a specific diet and exercise by the sea, he sounds like a 
                                                             
210 It might indeed be true that ‘there was no real break in the history of ‘Sophistic’ at all’ as Anderson (1993) 18 
suggests. Even though he rightly raises this point, he does not delve into what the actual continuities in subject matter 
and performative value consisted in.   
211 Her. 4.9. 
212 Ibid. 2.6; cf. 4.10–11, 6.1. 
213 Ibid. 7.3–4, 11.5, 14. 
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217 Ibid. 33.41; cf. Sidebottom (2009) 84. 
218 Ibid. 33.44. 
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220 Ibid. 33.14. 
221 Philostr. VA 1.8. 
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Homeric iatrosophistes224; he also invents writing and measurement. Odysseus calls him σοφιστήν 
pejoratively225, a further attestation to his φθόνος. Some other aspects of the hero’s behavior can 
be (mis)taken for either sophistic or philosophical: he was often engrossed in his thoughts and 
would isolate himself in the mountains, whence wise men took up the habit to observe the sky 
from the highest places226. Another example is the hero’s attitude towards rewards of courage: he 
is twice distinguished in battle and yet gives all the credit once to Diomedes227 and once to 
Achilles228 keeping a low profile; however, if the Achaeans ever offered a prize for wisdom, he 
would not yield it to anyone else because love for wisdom was his constant pursuit229. Ambiguity 
is intentional here, in that it reflects the overlapping fluidity between these labels as well as the 
tensions amongst the elite who adopted these roles for their self-presentation.   
This said, we see that through the narrative of Palamedes Philostratus promotes the 
reconciliation between sophistry and philosophy, an idea we also discussed in chapter 1 in relation 
to how Gorgias was presented in Lives and the letter. Palamedes was routinely used ever since 
fifth-century tragedy to reflect on the nature of wisdom as well as the ambivalence of 
knowledge230. Such problems reflected the undecisive debates of both Classical and Second-
Sophistic intellectuals. In Philsotratus, the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes also translates 
to the competing models of sophia and education231. ‘Palamedean sophia’ has no ambivalence 
whatsoever; the hero always provides for the good of the community. In establishing that this type 
of ‘Palamedean sophia’ is only positively charged in terms of ethics, Philostratus once again uses 
Gorgias. Although rhetoric for Gorgias could be used for either good or bad purposes, wisdom is 
by nature good. In Pal. 25, σοφία is constructed as mutually exclusive with μανία. These two 
cannot go hand in hand because madness is defined as attempting things that are impossible (ἔργοις 
ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀδυνάτοις), useless (ἀσυμφόροις), and shameful (αἰσχροῖς); such acts harm the friend 
and benefit the enemy; they also cause the perpetrator’s life to be disgraceful (ἐπονείδιστον) and 
precarious (σφαλερόν). As a token of his wisdom the hero invokes his previous life and former 
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inventions, which aimed at making life well-provided (πόριμον) and well-adorned 
(κεκοσμημένον)232. Sophia is framed in terms of artfulness (τεχνήεντα), aptitude (δεινόν), and 
resourcefulness (πόριμον)233.  
 
 
III. Innovation 
 
The notion of ‘universality of Gorgias’ is diffuse in Heroicus and is re-activated in both the here 
and now of the dialogue and in the distant myth of Greek heroes, which frames it. It is time now 
to see how these intertextual establishments, in co-examination, facilitate Philostratus’ articulation 
of (heroic) sophia. 
 Sophia is in nature transcendental and omnipotent, in that it acknowledges epistemai or 
technai, such as medicine and divination as subsidiary. Palamedes, in the third vignette, affirms 
that even though he did not study medicine, his wisdom suffices to discover the most suitable 
course of action. In the beginning of section 33, we read that Palamedes arrived at Chiron’s already 
self-taught (αὐτομαθῆ)234, he was practiced in wisdom (καὶ σοφίας ἤδη γεγυμνασμένον), and with 
more of it than Chiron (πλείω γιγνώσκοντα ἢ ὁ Χείρων)235. Αὐτομάθεια (self-teaching or self-
learning) denotes one’s inherent skill to supply the cognitive and technical content in order to 
solve a problem. Although Palamedes never studied medicine, he spoke like a physician because 
his wisdom enabled him to know this techne all alone. This addition is essential to our inquiry 
since it clarifies the epistemological grounds underpinning ‘Palamedean wisdom’236. A true sophos 
is a good rhetor and a practical philosopher. The vinedresser enjoys the wisdom of Protesilaus who 
cures diseases and has prophetic knowledge. Engagement with heroic cult and the past affords 
today’s man to partake of the divine knowledge of heroes. This is why, before the story of the 
Mysian campaign starts, the vinedresser asks the as yet uninitiated Phoenician to make offerings 
to Protesilaus (τὰ δ’ ἐμβατήρια τοῦ λόγου τῷ Πρωτεσίλεῳ εὔχθω)237. Finally, what is most 
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important about the author’s idea of wisdom is how it operates and where it is expressed. The 
answer to the first question is by means of inventiveness; in this thesis, we saw how heuresis as a 
rhetorical, compositional, and expositional element informs through the myth of Palamedes the 
core of sophistic declamation. The vinedresser by communing with Protesilaus is not taught the 
hero’s wisdom; rather, he learns how to discover the truth himself, a truth that is already there, just 
like the letters were revealed to Palamedes; in like manner, Palamedes develops his own eros for 
sophia, independent of Chiron’s private teachings, just like Gorgias, who only professed to teach 
his students a set of rhetorical methods whereby one masters virtue. As for the latter question, for 
Philostratus and for his Second-Sophistic declamatory world, exposing one’s sophia makes sense 
in a society that is altogether antagonistic, a society where professional sophists and intellectuals 
boost their students to ruin their rivals’ lectures and lampoon their performances, a society where 
φθόνος against an outstanding individual can grow so big that it would conceivably be no longer 
funny to say he would be stoned to death.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, I examined how two fundamental notions, which Philostratus ascribes to Gorgias of 
Leontini, are re-activated in Heroicus. Specifically, the idea of ‘father of sophistry’ conveys a 
twofold meaning: on the one hand, accepting someone as literary father entails authority. On the 
other hand, it also implies a (sub-)conscious fervor on the part of the upcoming author to challenge 
the imposed directives and surpass authority, ideas inherent in development of thought and 
sophistic sentiment; Gorgias provided a sturdy framework and a set of methods, which prospective 
students of rhetoric and public speakers adopted and adapted. As we saw, adaptation informed 
largely Gorgianic rhetoric, which acknowledged the importance of kairos and valorized truth as 
partisan and contingent upon community. Having studied exemplar material, Philostratus detached 
himself from authorities such as Gorgias and Homer and reconfigured his own literary persona. 
 The second notion, ‘Gorgianizing’, figures more prominently in the letter to Julia, where 
an author’s (also Philostratus’) success is attainable by way of emulation (φιλοτιμία), whereas 
those who failed in their careers, did so out of unproductive envy (φθόνος). These two notions 
justify why Philostratus saw Gorgias as the master of sophistic knowledge. 
  In the main part of the thesis, we saw how Heroicus engages in ‘allusive Gorgianizing’. 
First, the universality of ‘Gorgianic argument’ was studied in relation to the revisionist project of 
Heroicus (Chapter 2); the vinedresser, in the course of initiating his Phoenician interlocutor into 
the true wisdom of Protesilaus, used argumentation strategies, which evoked Gorgias’ Palamedes. 
As we saw, this playful ‘refutation’ does not at all deny the canonical status of prevailing accounts. 
Yet, it perceives this canonicity as historically contingent238. If they were to invent new stories and 
present them to their contemporary readers, authors like Philostratus, had to endorse the 
authoritative status of foundational texts and at the same time abrogate – with some plausibility – 
that authority to their own accounts. The invention of these ‘new’ stories occurred to Philostratus 
in the exact same natural way as the letters of the alphabet were revealed to Palamedes. Later on 
(Chapter 3), we focused on the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes as a re-enactment of 
Gorgias’ Palamedes. Philostratus used Gorgias’ rhetorical heuresis and rhetoric (as shown through 
the medicine example in Gorgias) as foils for his own record of the Trojan War and for articulating 
and promoting his own conception of sophia. The oppositional aspect of the rivalry reflected the 
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competitive – often invidious – environment of Second Sophistic intellectuals, as well as the 
various models of paideia and sophia populating their debates.     
 In all, Gorgias served for Philostratus as a marker of (Pan-)Hellenic identity as well as a 
rhetorical vector of his literary self-presentation. Emulation in this case is not confined to sheer 
stylistic figuration; rather, Philostratus took pains at decoding and incorporating the sophist’s 
substantive thought. A bunch of playful ‘Gorgiasms’ may reside in Lives or Vita Apollonii but 
mainly as a means of displaying Philostratus’ erudition. 
 Finally, a few remarks about the text. Heroicus is an extraordinary piece of Imperial 
literature and quite suggestive of the cultural and social anxieties of the Second Sophistic world. 
The dialogue takes place at the very end of the Thracian Chersonese, what modern-day Greeks 
call Ελλήσποντος and what modern-day Turks call Çanakkale Boğazı. For sure, the prospective 
visitor will no longer hear the nightingales ‘Atticize’239 let alone ‘Gorgianize’ there. On the 
contrary, in Elaious as in many other places mentioned in our text, such as Methymna, Lemnos, 
or even Phoenicia, the modern visitor will happen on thousands of hopeless refugees, bereft of 
their ‘sybaris’, and requiring humanitarian assistance. Other than that, not much has changed over 
these eighteen centuries: land is constantly disputed, the threat of an uninvited interloper is ever-
present, while most intellectuals tenaciously resist entering ‘the Palamedean stage’. Gorgias says 
in Helen 11 that we humans operate in a state of doxa (opinion), which is a misleading counselor 
of our soul rendering it susceptible to persuasive yet false logoi. The reason for this is because we 
can neither remember the past (οὔτε μνησθῆναι τὸ παροιχόμενον), nor examine the present (οὔτε 
σκέψασθαι τὸ παρόν), nor divine the future (οὔτε μαντεύσασθαι τὸ μέλλον). Heroicus seems to 
point in a more optimistic direction; it poses the question of how one should look at their past in 
order to understand one’s present and secure safe travels for the future. To this end, two points are 
crucial: on the one hand, cultural heritage is not something to just be quoted, ‘twittered’ or taken 
for granted; the narrative of the renaissance of ancient literary excellence – seen as a particularly 
distinctively Greek phenomenon – has nurtured and continues to nurture nationalist ideologies and 
hypostasize elite claims to cultural superiority240. Heroicus posits that we need to examine, 
interrogate, understand and, above all, adapt and reinterpret our past. On the other hand, losing 
touch with our past means losing touch with our human nature, while abolishing the valence of 
cultural tradition entails a weakness to rise above the problems of our days. As Tim Whitmarsh 
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points out, ‘the past is sublime, powerfully meaningful and self-present, but at the same time 
elusive and distant’241. Spectral and slippery though it remains, in order to perceive the 
epiphanically revealed ‘truth’ of the heroes, we need to keep cultivating their wisdom, update their 
stories, and establish continuities in ways that respond to the current states of affairs. This process 
of self-construction calls for a change of perspective, exploration of the alternative and the 
uncanonical; as Protesilaus would put it, a top-to-toe metamphiesis.   
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